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Abstract
We design a labor market experiment to compare demand- and supply-side policies to
tackle youth unemployment, a key issue in low-income countries. The experiment tracks
1700 workers and 1500 …rms over four years to compare the e¤ect of o¤ering workers either
vocational training (VT) or …rm-provided training (FT) for six months in a common setting
where youth unemployment is above 60%. Relative to control workers we …nd that averaged
over three post-intervention years, FT and VT workers: (i) enjoy large and similar upticks in
sector-speci…c skills, (ii) signi…cantly improve their employment rates, and, (iii) experience
marked improvements in an index of labor market outcomes. These averages, however, mask
di¤erences in dynamics: FT gains materialize quickly but fade over time, while VT gains
emerge slowly but are long-lasting, leading VT worker employment and earning pro…les to
rise above those of FT workers. Estimating a job ladder model of worker search reveals the key
reason for this: VT workers receive signi…cantly higher rates of job o¤ers when unemployed
thus hastening their movement back into work. This likely stems from the fact that the
skills of VT workers are certi…ed and therefore can be demonstrated to potential employers.
Tackling youth unemployment by skilling youth using vocational training pre-labor market
entry, therefore appears to be more e¤ective than incentivizing …rms through wage subsidies
to hire and train young labor market entrants. JEL Classi…cation: J2, M5.
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1 Introduction
Youth unemployment is a major challenge in the developing world. A growing mass of young
workers are failing to …nd work in manufacturing and service sectors consisting mainly of small-
scale …rms. This raises two questions. On the supply side, why don’t workers acquire the skills
that can help them secure jobs? On the demand side, what prevents …rms hiring these workers?
Answering these questions is important – how development proceeds in the coming decades will
be largely determined by whether or not these young workers can be employed in good jobs.
Nowhere is the youth unemployment challenge more keenly felt than in East Africa where the
majority of the population is aged below 25, and youth represent 60% of the unemployed. We
study interventions to tackle youth unemployment in urban labor markets in Uganda, the country
with the second lowest median age in the world, where formal sector youth employment rates are
below 30%, and youth are mostly engaged in insecure and informal casual work.
To do this we design a two-sided experiment involving workers and …rms which allows us to
compare supply- and demand-side interventions – vocational training and …rm-provided training
through apprenticeships – commonly used across the world to help workers transition into the
labor market. As the vocational training and …rm-provided training interventions are …elded in
the same setting we can directly compare their impacts on workers. To investigate mechanisms,
we use the experimental results to estimate a job ladder model with treatment speci…c transition
parameters. This is our core contribution.1
Both interventions are designed to improve skills, but they do so by relaxing di¤erent con-
straints. On the supply side, subsidized vocational training may help workers overcome credit
market imperfections which prevent them from investing in skills or imperfect knowledge regard-
ing the return to di¤erent skills [Jensen 2010]. Moreover, vocational training formally provided by
vocational training institutes (VTIs) gives workers certi…ed skills, showing which sector-speci…c
skills they were trained in. This ameliorates adverse selection and can enhance the labor mobility
of vocationally trained workers as long as there are …rms willing and able to hire them.2 If these
do not exist, only a policy that relaxes …rms’ hiring constraints will increase employment rates.
On the demand side, subsidized apprenticeships might help …rms overcome credit market im-
perfections which prevent them from incurring the costs of hiring and training workers, or of
learning about the ability and match quality of inexperienced workers. However, …rms cannot
1Earlier studies have often evaluated a combination of in-class vocational and on-the-job training, e.g. JTPA
in the US and the YTS in the UK. In low-income settings, Card et al. [2011] and Attanasio et al. [2011] both
evaluate the impacts of combining three months of vocational training followed by three month apprenticeships,
in the Dominican Republic and Colombia respectively. On-the-job training, internships and wage subsidies are all
common policy approaches that have been used to target disadvantaged groups in the labor market. The justi…cation
for such approaches are twofold: (i) to reduce employer screening costs [Autor 2001, Hardy and McCasland 2017];
(ii) to provide workers some labor market experience that can have persistent impacts [Pallais 2014].
2Evidence of the value of certi…cation in labor markets is provided by Pallais [2014], MacLeod et al. [2015],
Abebe et al. [2018], Bassi and Nansamba [2019], Abel et al. [2019], and Carranza et al. [2019].
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avoid the time costs associated with training a new worker which may be large in a context where
…rms are small and where much of the training must be done by the …rm owner.
Our research design provides evidence on these elements. Workers in our study are disadvan-
taged youth entering the labor market. On the demand side, we have small and medium size
enterprises (SMEs) in both manufacturing and service sectors, a core segment of the Ugandan
economy. We track 1700 workers and 1500 …rms over four years, after randomly assigning workers
to either control, vocational training (VT) for six months, or …rm training (FT) for six months.
To evaluate treatment e¤ects on skills we develop a sector-speci…c skills test together with
skills assessors in Uganda. Our …rst …nding is that, two to three years post-intervention, workers
who have received training have accumulated sector speci…c skills (equivalent to a 30% or 4
increase over control workers). The magnitude of the improvement is almost identical across both
VT and FT workers ( = 902). This is important because it helps to shut down one potential
di¤erence between treatments.3
Our second …nding is that there is substantial divergence in compliance: 68% of workers as-
signed to VT start this training, but only 24% of workers assigned to FT do. This gap is driven
by …rm, rather than worker, characteristics. In common with earlier studies, …rm interest is a key
limiting factor [Groh et al. 2016], here due to the fact that training was a time- and resource-costly
requirement for …rm owners as their involvement in the training of apprentices was monitored and
enforced. This feature of the experiment is policy relevant when thinking through supply- and
demand-side policies to tackle youth unemployment. It also shapes how we estimate treatment
e¤ects, the structural model, and how we conduct the IRR analysis. Throughout, we focus on
workers’ labor market outcomes and estimate both the ITT and the ATE for compliers. ITT,
because, by averaging over compliers and non-compliers, they re‡ect likely binding challenges to
scaling-up VT and FT interventions in the same context, or of exporting them to other contexts.
ATE, because by focusing on compliers, they map closely to theories of training and enable us to
examine the channels via which VT and FT e¤ects di¤er for trained workers.
Our third …nding is that both treatments improve an index of worker labor market outcomes,
that combines employment, total labor supply and earnings. Due to di¤erences in compliance the
ranking of the two treatments depends on whether we look at ITT or ATE but in both cases we fail
to reject the null of equality. Indeed, the ATE estimates show increases by 473 for FT workers
and by 272 for VT workers ( = 202) while ITT show increases by 105 for FT workers and
by 170 for VT workers ( = 169).4
3Our setting departs from the standard Beckerian framework in two ways: (i) we subsidize the apprenticeships
through the wage subsidy, making …rms more willing to provide skills that are not …rm-speci…c; (ii) …rms are
contractually required to provide sector-speci…c skills to workers. This form of apprenticeship – where …rms do not
bear the full cost of training but are contractually obliged to train workers and monitored in doing so – is a policy
that can be replicated and scaled-up by government.
4In relation to earlier studies that have evaluated a combination of vocational and on-the-job training, Card
et al. [2011] …nd no evidence of employment impacts; Attanasio et al. [2011] …nd a 7% increase in employment
rates for women and a 20% earnings increase. Galasso et al. [2004], Levinsohn et al. [2014] and Groh et al. [2016]
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These similarities mask di¤erences in dynamic treatment e¤ects. FT workers …nd employment
more quickly than VTworkers, but over time their employment rate converges to the control group,
while employment rates for VT workers increase over time. This reversal of fortune between FT
and VT workers is also found for earnings – FT workers do well initially but then over time,
their earnings fall behind those of VT workers. VT workers steadily increase their earnings and
diverge away from the control group. In other words, the similarity in ATE treatment e¤ects
between FT and VT workers when averaged over post-intervention survey waves is driven by the
earlier quarters in which FT workers were hired by …rms incentivized through wage subsidies.
Subsequent to that, the patterns of employment and earnings di¤er across VT and FT workers,
with FT workers having similar employment pro…les as control workers.5
The second part of the analysis builds on this insight. Under the assumption that by endline
(three years post-intervention), workers have reached their steady state wage trajectory, we esti-
mate a job ladder model of worker search. This emphasizes three mechanisms driving labor market
outcomes: (i) arrival rates of job o¤ers when unemployed or when employed; (ii) job separation
rates; (iii) skills. The model allows workers to be heterogeneous in two dimensions: their training
(treatments), and their type- that determines their productivity on-the-job. We operationalize
worker types by linking them to the measurable skills of workers. This form of observed worker
heterogeneity provides an avenue for using the model for counterfactual analysis.
The job ladder model estimates reveal that: (i) VT workers have signi…cantly higher steady
state rates of unemployment-to-job (UJ) transitions than FT workers: if they fall o¤ the job ladder
into unemployment, they are more likely to get back on it; (ii) FT workers have very similar rates
of UJ transition as the control group: their history of labor market attachment seems to count for
little if they become unemployed. At the same time, accepted earnings conditional on employment
are similar between FT and VTworkers, consistent with them having similar skills, but VT workers
can more easily certify their skills and climb back onto the job ladder if unemployed. In steady
state, unconditional annual earnings of complier VT workers rise by 55% over controls, while the
earnings of complier FT workers rise by just over half of that, 31%.
Combining these results gives us a precise interpretation to what drives the dynamic treatment
e¤ects: vocational trainees pull away from FT workers in their employment rates and earnings
because they are more likely to get back onto the job ladder if they fall into unemployment. These
dynamics are not due to greater job-to-job mobility, suggesting the returns to skills certi…ability are
higher when unemployed than when employed. Moreover, compliers across training routes move as
far up the job ladder as each other – wages conditional on employment are similar for complier VT
and FT workers because their skills are similar. The key distinction is that VT workers are more
likely to get back onto the job ladder if they fall o¤ it. Tackling youth unemployment by skilling
evaluate wage subsidy interventions.
5Comparing two supply side interventions, Abebe et al. [2018] also …nd that the e¤ect of subsidies – in their
case to workers to fund transport – is short-lived while certi…cation has lasting impacts.
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youth using vocational training pre-labor market entry therefore appears to be more e¤ective than
incentivizing …rms through wage subsidies to hire and train young labor market entrants.
To understand how the results derived from the partial equilibrium model map to general
equilibrium impacts we exploit the two-sided experimental design allowing us to compare training
routes from the dual perspectives of workers and …rms. As in Crepon and Premand [2019], the
…rm-side of the experiment shows there are no employment displacement (or crowding in) e¤ects
on other workers – in either the short run when wage subsidies are in place, or in the long run
long after apprentices have left the …rm.
We use the model parameters to conduct two counterfactual simulations: (i) to assess the rela-
tive importance of the mechanisms at the heart of the model in explaining steady state outcomes;
(ii) to simulate treatment e¤ects if the training interventions were targeted to other workers in
the economy; in particular, by drawing on data from other studies in the same context, we sim-
ulate what would have been the impacts of targeting our treatments to workers that are able to
self-…nance vocational training, and that are already employed in SMEs in manufacturing sectors
similar to those in this current study.
We then combine program accounting costs with steady state earnings bene…ts to derive the
internal rate of return from each treatment. Assuming gains last 15 years, the IRR to vocational
training is 22%, while the IRR for …rm training is negative. It does not pay for the social planner
to replicate the kind of subsidized apprenticeship o¤ered in the FT treatment. However, the reason
for this negative IRR is the low compliance in the FT treatment: only 24% of such workers end
up being hired by …rms they are matched to.6 However, in these labor markets we do observe
workers paying …rms for apprenticeships using the kind of payment structure we set up in the FT
treatment. To see why this is so, we redo the IRR calculations based on the steady state earnings
for compliers – namely those that acquire …rm-provided or vocational training. Among this group
the IRR for VT workers rises to 33%, and for FT workers the IRR is 25%. The rise in IRR for
FT workers highlights the high social returns from being able to overcome …rm’s constraints in
taking-on and training young workers. Under these IRRs, both training routes pay for themselves.
This of course raises the question of why workers are not availing themselves of these returns by
paying for VT or FT themselves? A key reason may be credit constraints: the cost of vocational
training, or of self-…nancing apprenticeships, run into hundreds of dollars and so are both orders
of magnitude higher than young workers earnings at baseline ($6/month).
Despite their popularity, the evidence base for training programs, or in contrasting alternative
training programs in the same context, is thin. The meta-analyses of Blattman and Ralston [2015],
McKenzie [2017] and Card et al. [2018] show relatively weak or short-lived impacts of training
6This low compliance is driven by a lack of …rms taking-up the o¤er of the wage subsidy and the matched-to
worker (workers are as likely to accept o¤ers from …rms as vocational trainees are to accept the o¤er of training
from VTIs). Moreover, we document that less pro…table …rms are more likely to take-on workers through the FT
treatment. This suggests that these …rms are …nancially constrained in hiring young job seekers and that this is an
important demand-side constraint.
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programs in low-income settings. We thus close our analysis by highlighting potential explanations
for the impacts we document. A key explanation is that our training interventions were big push:
lasting longer and delivered more intensely than some earlier studies. Other factors such as the
selection of workers and vocational training institutes worked with also play a role. On each
dimension, we make suggestions for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting, experimental design and
data. Section 3 presents treatment e¤ects on worker skills and labor market outcomes. Section 4
develops the job ladder model. Section 5 presents model estimates. Section 6 presents counterfac-
tuals. Section 7 presents the IRR estimates and discusses external validity. Section 8 concludes.
Robustness checks and further estimation details are in the Appendix.
2 Setting, Design and Treatments
Our study is a collaboration with the NGO BRAC, who implemented all treatments, and …ve
reputable vocational training institutes (VTIs). The VTI sector in Uganda is well established,
with hundreds in operation. Each could o¤er standard six-month training courses in eight sectors:
welding, motor mechanics, electrical wiring, construction, plumbing, hairdressing, tailoring and
catering. These sectors constitute a source of stable wage employment for young workers in
Uganda: around 25% of employed workers aged 18-25 work in them.7
2.1 Setting
Workers Individuals were recruited into our evaluation throughout Uganda. We advertized an
o¤er of potentially receiving six months of sector-speci…c vocational training at one of the VTIs
we collaborated with. The eligibility criteria targeted disadvantaged youth. We received eligible
applications from 1714 individuals whose characteristics are shown in Table A1: 44% are women,
they are aged 20 on average, and the vast majority have never received vocational training.8
The …rst row of Table 1 shows baseline labor market outcomes for our workers: unemployment
rates are over 60% for these youth (Columns 2 and 3) with insecure casual work being the most
prevalent labor activity. Unconditionally, average monthly earnings are $6, corresponding to
7The VTIs we worked with: (i) were founded decades earlier; (ii) were mostly for-pro…t; (iii) trained hundreds
of workers with an average student-teacher ratio of 10; (iv) in four VTIs, our worker sample shared classes with
regular trainees. We derive the share of employed workers aged 18-25 working in these eight sectors using the
2012/3 Uganda National Household Survey.
8The program was advertized using standard channels, and there was no requirement to participate in other
BRAC programs to be eligible. The eligibility criteria were based on: (i) being aged 18-25; (ii) having completed
at least (most) a P7 (S4) level of education (corresponding to 7-11 years); (iii) not being in full-time schooling;
(iv) a poverty score, based on family size, assets owned, type of building lived in, village location, fuel used at
home, number of household members attending school, monthly wage, and education level of the household head.
Applicants were ranked on a 1-5 score on each dimension and a total score computed. A geographic-speci…c
threshold score was used to select eligibles.
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around 10% of the Ugandan per capita income at the time. Hence these individuals are unlikely
to be able to self-…nance investment into vocational training (that costs over $400), or to pay a
…rm for an apprenticeship. Table A2 compares our sample to those aged 18-25 in the Uganda
National Household Survey from 2012/3. The intervention appears well targeted: our sample is
worse o¤ in terms of labor market outcomes at baseline, and that remains true when we compare
to youth in the UNHS who report being labor market active.9
Our experiment uses an oversubscription design. This is informative of the impact of mar-
ginally expanding such training. Given Ugandan demographics, there is no shortage of the kind
of disadvantaged youth that applied to our o¤er.
Firms To draw a sample of …rms, we conducted a …rm census in 15 urban labor markets. We
selected …rms: (i) operating in one of the eight manufacturing and service sectors in which we
o¤ered sector-speci…c vocational training; (ii) having between one and 15 employees (plus a …rm
owner). The …rst criterion limits skills mismatch in our study. The second restriction excludes
micro-entrepreneurs and ensures we focus on SMEs that are central to employment generation in
Uganda. We end up with a sample of 1538 SMEs, employing 4551 workers in total at baseline.
On constraints to expansion: (i) 65% of …rm owners reported the terms of available …nance
limiting their growth; (ii) 67% reported access to skilled labor as a constraint; (iii) 52% reported
the inability to screen workers as a constraint. Wage subsidies might help relax demand-side
constraints on SMEs related to hiring young labor market entrants.
Returns to Vocational Training Table A3 provides evidence on the supply of, and returns to,
vocational training in this setting. It shows: (i) the share of workers employed at baseline in these
…rms that self-report having ever received vocational training from a VTI; (ii) the coe¢cient on
a dummy for this self-report in a standard Mincerian wage regression of log wages. The …rst row
pools across all sectors and documents that at baseline, 31% of workers in our sample of SMEs
have vocational training from some VTI. Vocational training is therefore a common route through
which workers acquire skills in Uganda, and SME …rm owners are familiar with recruiting workers
with such training. The Mincerian returns to vocational training are over 50%, and this holds in
each sector. Of course the Mincerian returns are upward-biased due to selection into employment.
Our experimental results help quantify this selection bias. This evidence shows there is demand
for, and potentially high returns to, vocational training in the sectors that SMEs in our study
operate in. This is in contrast to high-income settings where many training programs have had
low returns or short-lived impacts on workers [Card et al. 2018].
9Unemployment rates are often di¢cult to de…ne in low-income contexts. It is thus perhaps more accurate to
speak of rates of non-employment, and for expositional ease, this is what we will implicitly have in mind when
referring to unemployment.
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Use of Apprenticeships Firm-sponsored training is another route through which workers ac-
cumulate human capital. Apprenticeships are a common labor contract throughout Sub-Saharan
Africa. Table A4 provides evidence on such contracts from our sample of SMEs. Panel A shows
that half the workers employed in control SMEs at baseline report having received on-the-job
training in their current …rm, with an average training duration of 10 months. Panel B shows a
variety of payment structures for apprentices: the majority are unpaid, some are paid, and others
pay for their training. For those paid during apprenticeships, they report an average monthly
wage of $39. Firm owners were asked about the skills composition of apprentices. Self-…nanced
apprentices are more likely to be reported to have sector-speci…c rather than …rm-speci…c skills.10
Panel C shows the main opportunity cost for taking on new hires is the …rm owner’s time: they
are predominantly tasked to train apprentices. This is especially so for self-…nanced apprentices:
56% report being trained exclusively by the …rm owner, and none report being trained only by
employees. Firm owners have the skills to train employees: they have signi…cantly more years
of education than workers, and are signi…cantly more likely to have received vocational training.
As mentioned above, most SMEs report an inability to screen workers as constraining expansion.
Hence, if SMEs are credit constrained, it is these kinds of up-front screening costs, or …rm owner’s
opportunity costs of training new hires, that are reduced in our apprenticeship treatment.11
2.2 Design
The left hand side of Figure 1 presents the design from a worker’s perspective. 1714 workers applied
to the o¤er of vocational training. Those randomly assigned to vocational training were split into
two treatments: the …rst group completed their six months of training and then transitioned into
the labor market. This is the business-as-usual training model, where VTIs are paid to train
workers, but not to …nd them jobs. The second group of vocationally trained workers, upon
graduation, were matched to …rms operating in the same sector as the worker had been trained
in, and located in the same region as the worker. On graduation, all trainees leave their VTI with
a certi…cate stating which VTI was attended, and the six-month training course taken.
Workers not o¤ered vocational training were randomly split into three groups: (i) to be matched
to …rms; (ii) to be matched to …rms and those …rms o¤ered a wage subsidy to hire and train them
on-the-job for six months (i.e. as an apprentice); (iii) held as a control. This design allows us
to thus compare and contrast supply- and demand-side interventions designed to raise skills and
10We note that: (i) for 52% of all apprentices their main cost is the opportunity cost of labor market opportunities
during the apprenticeship as well as …xed costs of work (e.g. travel, tools). (ii) For 29% of workers that pay for
their apprenticeship, the average total payment is over $500. Whichever way we calculate it, the expected cost of
an apprenticeship is above the baseline annual earnings of our sample workers.
11Firm owners’ role in training workers is well recognized. In the …rm-side surveys we interviewed employees in
our SMEs pre-intervention. We asked them about the role of the …rm owner in training workers. In the control
group of …rms, 79% of employees agreed with the statement, “Does the owner put special e¤ort in training and
retaining the best workers?”, and when asked, “What do you feel makes it better to work at this …rm relative to
your competitors, if anything?”, 43% of employees reported the better training/learning opportunities.
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reduce youth unemployment, and to understand the nature of constraints on workers and …rms
that prevent such human capital investments being undertaken.
Although workers were randomly assigned to treatment at the point of application, they were
only informed about any match that might be o¤ered once vocational trainees had completed their
courses. Second, the design ensures vocational trainees and …rm-trained workers both come into
contact with …rms at the same time: this is in line with the underlying motivation for our study,
to understand labor market transitions of youth. However, inevitably this means that vocational
trainees receive their training before …rm-trained workers do. This six month divergence in training
times is however unlikely to bias estimates based on three years of follow-up data.
We assign workers to treatment using a strati…ed randomization where strata are region of
residence, gender and education. Table 1 shows the labor market characteristics of workers in
each treatment. Table A1 shows other background characteristics. In both cases, the samples are
well balanced, and normalized di¤erences in observables are small.
The right hand side of Figure 1 shows the design from a …rm’s perspective: …rms were randomly
assigned to either be matched with: (i) vocationally trained workers; (ii) untrained workers; (iii)
untrained workers and given a wage subsidy to hire and train them; (iv) or held as a control.12
Timeline Figure 2 shows the study timeline: the baseline worker survey took place from June to
September 2012 just after workers applied for vocational training. Eligible workers were tracked in
surveys …elded 24 36 and 48months after baseline (12 24 and 36months after the end of vocational
training/apprenticeships).13 Only 13% of workers attrit by the 48-month endline. Appendix A.1
describes correlates of attrition, con…rming attrition is uncorrelated to treatment.
The lower part of Figure 2 shows the timeline of …rm surveys. We use these data to compare
…rm outcomes between those o¤ered the apprenticeship and the control group. In particular we
estimate short and long run employment displacement e¤ects of the FT treatment. As we describe
later, these results on (a lack of) displacement help us to extrapolate results from the structural
model – that is in partial equilibrium – to understand the general equilibrium impacts of …rm-
provided training in these urban labor markets.
12In a companion paper, Bandiera et al. [2017], we provide a comprehensive analysis of the …rm side impacts of
all these treatments (and other treatments), and what light they shed on constraints to expansion that SMEs face.
Of relevance for the current analysis is that: (i) …rms are balanced on observables across treatments, including on
monthly pro…ts, employee numbers, the value of the capital stock, age and owner characteristics; (ii) we …nd that
…rms assigned to the wage subsidy treatment are more likely to attrit by the …rst follow up (but not by endline),
and we account for this by weighting observations using inverse probability weights.
13We surveyed those randomized out of vocational training just as vocational trainees were transitioning into the
labor market. The tracker survey had a 23% attrition rate. The work status of respondents were as follows: 19%
were currently involved in some work activity, 11% had been involved in a work activity in the last six months (but
not on survey date), and 70% had not worked in the last six months.
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2.3 Treatments
Vocational Training Vocational training provides workers six months of sector-speci…c training
in one of eight sectors. In treatment arms involving vocational training (T3, T4), BRAC entirely
covered training costs, at $470 per trainee. Lessons were held Monday-Friday, for six hours per
day; 30% of course content was dedicated to theory, 70% to practical work covering sector-speci…c
skills and managerial/business skills. VTIs signed contracts with BRAC to deliver these standard
training courses to workers. They were monitored by regular and unannounced visits by BRAC
sta¤ to ensure workers were present and being trained. For each worker, VTIs were paid half the
training fee at the start of training, and half at the end, conditional on them having trained the
worker (this staggered timing of payments ensured VT workers nearly always completed the full
course of training conditional on enrolling).14
Firm Training In the …rm-provided training treatment, we o¤ered …rms to meet untrained
workers and receive $50 a month for six months if they hired and trained one such worker on-
the-job. This was an in‡exible wage subsidy: $12/month was to be retained by the owner, and
$38/month was to be paid to the worker. This di¤ers from the standard Beckerian apprenticeship
model in that the …rm does not bear the full training cost. As such, the skills provided to workers
might di¤er than in other apprenticeship structures. As Table A4 showed, workers do sometimes
pay for their training in these labor markets, and this is associated with more intensive involvement
of …rm owners in training workers.
We assess whether the level of the wage subsidy is reasonable using two anchors: (i) Table
A4 showed that during apprenticeships, if workers were paid their mean wage was $39/month;
(ii) using the wages of all unskilled workers employed in our SMEs at baseline, our wage subsidy
treatment had a subsidy rate (wage subsidy/average wage) of 111% (Figure A1a shows the dis-
tribution of unskilled wages at baseline among those employed in our SMEs). This is high: for
example, de Mel et al. [2019] evaluate a wage subsidy program with a 50% subsidy rate.
This FT treatment was designed as a formal training program, backed by an explicit contractual
agreement between …rm owners and our implementing partner, BRAC. This was intended to mirror
the vocational training program as far as possible, but with training being conducted at a …rm
rather than at a VTI. The contract between BRAC and …rm owners in the FT treatment is shown
in Figure A2. The contract is succinct and clearly states: (i) …rm owners agree to train the worker
in a speci…c trade for six months; (ii) …rm owners would pay back the entire subsidy if the trainee
was found not to be receiving training, or was not showing up to the …rm regularly. There was
14The cost per trainee breaks down as the cost to the VTI ($400), plus the worker’s out-of-pocket costs during
training, such as those for travel and accommodation ($70). The staggered incentive contract solved drop out
problems associated with training programs in low-income settings [Blattman and Ralston 2015]. There was no
additional stipend paid to trainees during training, and no child care o¤ered (recall that around 10% of our worker
sample have at least one child).
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no explicit training curriculum: …rm owners were free to train workers as they saw …t, as long as
sector-speci…c training was provided (as VTIs were also tasked to do).
As with VTIs, monitoring checks were used to ensure these agreements were adhered to. Firm
owners and trainee workers were monitored during the six months of training in two ways: (i)
each …rm was provided an attendance register, and every day both the …rm owner and the worker
had to sign it, providing the worker’s time of arrival and departure; (ii) BRAC sta¤ conducted
monthly unannounced spot checks at …rm premises to verify the worker was showing up and being
trained. Payments were disbursed monthly at the local BRAC o¢ce, and both the …rm owner
and the worker had to be present at disbursement, where they were asked to sign an additional
register to certify the worker was showing up regularly at the …rm and receiving training. Figure
A1b shows worker and …rm reports on the wage subsidy being received by the worker, with a clear
spike at $38/month as intended.
Matching In the matching treatments …rms were presented lists of workers that were: (i) willing
to work and vocationally trained (T4); (ii) willing to work but untrained (T2, T5). In case (i),
the …rms knew what sector the workers had been trained in, where they had been trained, but
not that training had been paid for by BRAC. There were a maximum of two workers presented
to …rms on a list, and the randomly assigned matches took place with …rms operating in the same
sector as the worker had been trained in (or had expressed an initial desire to be trained in), and
in the same region as the worker was located.
3 Treatment E¤ects
3.1 Compliance
Workers may not comply with their treatment, and for treatments involving worker-…rm matches,
there can also be non-compliance driven by …rms because worker-…rm matches only occur if both
a worker and the …rm express a willingness to meet. Table A6 shows worker and …rm take-up rates
by treatment. For treatments involving vocational training we see that: (i) over 95% of workers
that initially apply for vocational training are later found and o¤ered it (Column 1); (ii) 68% of
workers take-up the o¤er of vocational training and complete the training (Column 2); conditional
on enrolment, over 94% of them completed the training.
For workers assigned to the FT treatment, 51% are actually o¤ered a meeting with a …rm
(Column 3). In common with earlier studies, …rm interest is a key limiting factor on worker-…rm
matches occurring [Groh et al. 2016]. The explanation is that the FT treatment required …rm
owners to provide time and resource-costly training. We provide additional evidence on this from
process reports collected during the intervention roll-out. Firm owners who were not interested
in taking on a worker in the FT treatment were asked why: 62% said the subsidy was not large
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enough to cover training costs, in line with demand-side credit constraints binding.
However, conditional on the worker-…rm match, 80% of meetings take place (Column 4), 90% of
interviewed workers are o¤ered a job (Column 5), and two thirds of job o¤ers are accepted (Column
6). This o¤er acceptance rate to …rm-provided training is very close to the 68% compliance rate for
vocational training. The di¤erence in compliance rates between FT and VT is not driven by the
share of workers taking-up training o¤ers, but by the share receiving o¤ers from …rms to provide
them training. As a result, only 24% of workers initially assigned to FT end up being employed
and trained at the matched …rm.
Firm’s lack of interest in meeting workers is most severe in the treatments involving matching
(T4, T5): only 13% and 19% of workers end up being o¤ered a meeting with a …rm in these
treatments (Column 3). This is not surprising in this context: given youth unemployment rates
of around 60% …rms should have little di¢culty in meeting untrained workers, and as Table A3
showed, around one third of employees in SMEs are vocationally trained and so SMEs might have
no di¢culty meeting trained workers. In short, there is not much evidence for search frictions
related to meeting untrained workers or meeting skilled workers in these labor markets.
Given the low worker-…rm matching rate in the vocational training plus match treatment (T4),
for the remainder of the analysis we combine these workers with those assigned to the vocational
training treatment (T3). Moreover, given the low worker-…rm matching rate in the pure matching
treatment for untrained workers (T5), we drop this treatment arm for the bulk of the analysis.
This allows us to focus attention throughout on the comparison between vocationally trained
(VT) workers (T3 and T4) and …rm-trained (FT) workers.
3.1.1 Di¤erential Compliance Between Vocational and Firm-provided Training
There is a divergence in compliance between VT and FT treatments: 68% of workers assigned to
vocational training start this training, and 24% of workers assigned to …rm-provided training are
hired by …rms they are matched to. To understand whether outcome di¤erences between VT and
FT can be due to lower compliance in FT, we …rst establish whether FT compliance relates to
worker traits, that might in turn determine returns to training. The experimental design has two
features that help rule this out. First, eligibility requirements mechanically ensure that individuals
in the sample are relatively homogeneous. Second, by design, …rms in the FT treatment could
only train one of two workers assigned to them. Hence, their ability to choose on worker traits
was limited among a relatively homogenous pair of workers presented to them.
Table A7 provides regression evidence on the correlates of compliance in the FT treatment.
Column 1 controls for worker characteristics, and shows that 10 out of 11 of these do not predict
take-up (with the other being marginally signi…cant). This is in line with there being limited
variation in worker traits presented to …rms. Column 2 shows this is robust when we add pro-
gram related characteristics. In contrast, when …rm characteristics are added, these are jointly
12
signi…cant in predicting compliance ( = 002). This is driven by …rms with signi…cantly lower
pro…ts per worker taking on FT workers. Hence, …rms hiring workers when given a wage subsidy
incentive appear to be negatively selected. Finally, Column 4 shows that when we control for
…rm …xed e¤ects (that is possible given multiple workers were presented to the same …rm), worker
characteristics remain jointly insigni…cant predictors of compliance ( = 976).15
This all suggests compliers are similar in FT and VT treatments because lower compliance in
FT is explained by …rm, not worker, characteristics. We thus consider take-up to be exogenous,
given that compliance is not predicted by worker characteristics. This allows us to compare ATE
estimates of both training routes, narrowing the interpretation of di¤erences between them as
stemming from either the skills imparted, or the certi…ability of those skills. To explore this
further, we next provide descriptive evidence on skill accumulation among VT and FT workers.
In the next Section we estimate treatment e¤ects on various dimensions of skills accumulation.
3.1.2 Descriptive Evidence on Skill Accumulation Among Compliers
Vocational Training We surveyed VT workers towards the end of the training and asked about
their satisfaction with it: 76% were extremely happy/very happy with the experience; 86% were
extremely happy/very happy with the skills gained; 96% reported skills acquisition as being better
than or as expected, and 56% reported that six-months of training was enough time for them to
learn the skills they had wanted to.
Firm-provided Training We provide two pieces of evidence to con…rm workers hired under
the FT treatment were trained. From the …rst …rm follow-up survey, that was deliberately …elded
around the end of the six-month apprenticeship period, …rm owners were asked to indicate for
each employee hired in the last six months: (i) their productivity (on a 1 to 5 scale) when hired;
(ii) their productivity at the time of the survey (or when the worker left the …rm).
Panel A of Figure A3 shows the productivity growth of hired FT workers alongside that for: (i)
hired workers at control …rms, (ii) hired workers at control …rms who received on-the-job training,
(iii) hired workers at control …rms that did not receive on-the-job training; (iv) hired workers in
FT …rms excluding those hired through our FT treatment. We see that hired FT workers had
an increase in productivity of 224 points during the wage subsidy period, higher than for all
other comparison groups. Hence workers hired under the FT treatment received training over and
above what these …rms would normally provide, in line with their contractual requirements with
BRAC, and reinforcing the notion that this was a resource and time-intensive treatment from
…rms’ perspective.
15Evidence from the process reports further bolsters this. In less than 4% of cases did …rms report turning
down a worker in the FT treatment because of worker characteristics. Firms interested in taking-on a trainee
reported they were happy to take on any of the workers assigned to them, and were not searching for speci…c
trainee characteristics. Moreover, most …rms that did not take-on a worker did not even meet any worker matched
to them, again consistent with worker characteristics not mattering in …rm selection.
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We also use data from the …rst worker follow-up survey, conducted around six months after
the wage subsidy expired. For each job spell in the previous year workers were asked to report:
(i) their ability to perform a typical sector-speci…c task at the start of the spell (e.g. if the job
spell was in motor-mechanics, they were asked whether they were able to mend a tire tube); (ii)
their ability to perform the same task at the end of the job spell (or on survey date if the spell
was ongoing). The same questions were asked about an important …rm-speci…c task at the …rm
where the worker was employed (the worker indicated this task). Firm owners were asked the
same questions about each employee in the …rst …rm follow-up. We compare the rate of learning
on these tasks at the matched …rm for workers hired under the FT treatment. This comparison is
in Panel B of Figure A3. Reassuringly, worker and …rm reports are well aligned, and both show
substantial learning for both sector- and …rm-speci…c tasks.
3.2 Estimation
We present impacts on workers’ labor market outcomes and estimate both the ITT and the ATE
for compliers. The former are useful from a policymaker’s perspective because they re‡ect likely
binding challenges to scaling-up the training interventions in the same context, or to export them
to other contexts. We present ATE estimates because these map closely to theories of training
(that typically do not model non-compliance), and to show channels through which VT and FT
di¤er for trained workers. Our ITT estimates are based on the following ANCOVA speci…cation
for worker  in strata  in survey wave  = 1 2 3,
 =
X

 + 0 + x0 +  +  +  (1)
where  is the outcome of interest,  denotes worker  being randomly assigned to treatment 
(vocational training or …rm training), 0 is the outcome at baseline, x0 are the worker’s baseline
covariates.  and  are strata and survey wave …xed e¤ects respectively. As randomization is
at the worker level, we use robust standard errors, and we weight ITT estimates using inverse
probability weights (IPWs) to account for attrition. In the Appendix we show the robustness of
the main results to dropping all covariates except baseline outcomes, randomization strata, and
survey wave …xed e¤ects, and to not using IPWs.16
The ATE speci…cation replaces treatment assignment with treatment take-up (with the same
16The baseline worker characteristics x0 controlled for are age, a dummy for whether the worker was married,
a dummy for whether the worker had any children, a dummy for whether the worker was employed, and a dummy
for whether the worker scored at the median or above on a cognitive test administered at baseline. We also control
for the vocational training implementation round and month of interview. The weights for the IPW estimates are
computed separately for attrition at …rst, second and third follow-up. The instruments for the IPW estimates are
whether the worker was an orphan at baseline, a dummy if anyone in the household of the worker reported having
a phone at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker reported being willing to work in more than one sector at
the time of their original application to the VTIs and dummies for the survey team the worker’s interview was
assigned to in each of the three follow-up survey rounds.
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controls), where take-up is de…ned as a dummy equal to one if the worker: (i) started …rm training
in FT;, or (ii) started vocational training in VT. The earlier results showed compliance is not
drive by worker characteristics. We use treatment assignment as an IV for treatment take-up and
report 2SLS regression estimates, which measure the e¤ect of treatment on the compliers. We
bootstrap standard errors using 1,000 replications, and we report unadjusted p-values alongside
Romano-Wolf [2016] p-values accounting for multiple hypothesis testing.
The coe¢cient of interest is : the treatment e¤ect of  as averaged over the three post-
intervention survey waves. To transition from the treatment e¤ects to the structural estimates,
we then estimate dynamic treatment e¤ects. To do so, we convert our data to a worker job spells
data set, that is possible because in each survey workers were asked to provide their monthly labor
market history since the previous survey. These shed light on the evolution of treatment e¤ects, as
well as on whether workers are in steady state towards the end of our study period, underpinning
the job ladder model we develop and estimate.
 measures the causal e¤ect of treatment on outcomes under SUTVA. This will not hold
if treatment displaces control workers because treated workers are relatively more attractive to
…rms. To assess whether this is likely we …rst need to establish the relevant labor market for these
workers. We note that at baseline workers are geographically and sectorally mobile: the majority
are willing to travel to other labor markets, or change sector, to …nd work.17 De…ning a labor
market as a sector-region, our …rm census shows that on average, there are 156 employed workers
and 40 …rms in each market. We match an average of 8 workers per market, corresponding to 5%
of all workers. Hence we do not expect the control group to be contaminated by treated workers
in the same market as they are unlikely to be competing for the same exact job.18
3.3 Skills
If training routes are to impact labor market outcomes, they should …rst impact worker skills. We
present results on three aspects of skills acquisition. It is natural to focus on the ATEs, namely
on those that attended vocational training, or were hired as apprentices.
The …rst dimension of skills relates to whether workers report having been trained by a …rm
in their …rst employment spell. We de…ne two dummies: (i) whether the worker reports having
received on-the-job training at her …rst employer; (ii) whether the worker reported being a ‘trainee’
in her …rst employment spell. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show that for both outcomes, workers
hired by …rms in the FT treatment are between 56 and 77pp more likely than the control group
17At baseline, 33% of workers reported that they had previously attempted to …nd a job in a di¤erent town than
the one they come from. On workers sectoral mobility, at baseline 96% of workers reported being willing to work in
more than one sector. Moreover, only 15% of all main job spells of workers in the control group at …rst follow-up
are in the same sector as the ideal sector mentioned at baseline.
18Crepon et al. [2013] provide experimental estimates of the equilibrium impacts of labor market policies in
France using a design that randomizes the fraction of treated workers across labor markets, and individual treatment
assignment within labor markets.
15
to be …rm trained.19 More surprisingly: (i) vocationally trained workers are no more likely than
the control group to report being trainees in their …rst employment spell; (ii) workers assigned to
…rm training are signi…cantly more likely to report having received training or view themselves as
trainees than vocationally trained workers ( = 000 in Columns 1 and 2).
This suggests …rms are less willing to train workers that have already been vocationally trained
in sector-speci…c skills. We thus …nd no evidence of a complementarity between …rm-provided skills
and skills provided by vocational training institutes. The …nding is consistent with both training
routes providing workers similar skills, but also with …rms anticipating VT workers to be more
mobile than others because their skills are certi…able.
The second dimension we consider is a sector-speci…c skills test we developed in conjunction
with skills assessors and modulators of written and practical occupational tests in Uganda. Each
test comprises seven questions: Figure A4 shows an example of the skills test for the motor
mechanics sector. Workers had 20 minutes to complete the test, and we convert answers into
a 0-100 score. If workers answer questions randomly, their expected score is 11. The test was
conducted on all workers (including those assigned to the control group) at second and third
follow-up, so this outcome measures the persistence of skills accumulation in the VT and FT
treatments. There is no di¤erential attrition by treatment into the test.20
Before administering the test, we asked a …ltering question to workers on whether they had
any skills relevant for sectors in our study. The dependent variable in Column 3 of Table 2 is a
dummy equal to one if the worker reported having skills for a sector. The ATE estimates show
that VT workers and FT workers all report being signi…cantly more likely to have relevant skills
than control workers. As reported at the foot of the Table, 60% of controls report having skills
for some sector, and reassuringly this rises to 100% for FT workers that were hired by …rms, and
for VT workers that attended a VTI. This is consistent with the descriptive evidence in Figure
A3 suggesting complier workers in VT and FT treatments received actual training.
All workers that reported having sectoral skills took the test: others (mostly in the control
group) were assigned a score of 11 assuming they would answer the test at random. Column
4 shows that VT and FT workers signi…cantly increase their measurable sector-speci…c skills,
19This is over a baseline of 40% of workers in the control group reporting to have received training in their …rst
employment spell (Column 1), a magnitude that matches up well with the descriptive evidence in Table A4 where
50% of workers employed in the SMEs at baseline reported having been apprentices in the …rm.
20A few earlier papers have also used data from skills tests [Berniell and de la Mata 2016, Adhvaryu et al.
2017]. We developed the sector-speci…c skills tests over a two-day workshop with eight practicing skills assessors
and modulators of written and practical occupational tests from the Directorate of Industrial Training (DIT),
the Uganda Business and Technical Examinations Board (UBTEB) and the Worker’s Practically Acquired Skills
(PAS) Skills Testing Boards and Directorate. To ensure the test would not be biased towards merely capturing
theoretical/attitudinal skills taught only in VTIs, workshop modulators were instructed to: (i) develop questions
to assess psychomotor domain, e.g. trainees ability to perform a set of tasks on a sector-speci…c product/service;
(ii) formulate questions to mimic real-life situations (e.g. “if a customer came to the …rm with the following issue,
what would you do?”); (iii) avoid using technical terms used in VTI training. We pre-tested the skills assessment
tool both with trainees of VTIs, as well as workers employed in SMEs in the eight sectors we study (and neither
group was taken from our worker evaluation sample).
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as recorded two and three years after the training. Relative to controls, VT workers increase
sector-speci…c skills by 34% (or 4 of test scores). FT workers increase sector-speci…c skills by
32%. Strikingly, both training routes cause persistent skills accumulation, although there is no
signi…cant di¤erence in sector-speci…c skills accumulation between VT and FT workers ( = 902).
A contribution we make to the training literature is to quantify the causal productivity impacts
on workers of on-the-job training. Much of the earlier evidence has been based on observational
data and there has been a long-standing debate over whether there are substantive human capital
impacts of such training [Blundell et al. 1999], especially once the endogenous selection of workers
into training is corrected for [Leuven and Oosterbeek 2008].
The fact that FT workers are provided sector-speci…c skills goes against a standard Beckerian
framework of …rm-sponsored training. Our setting departs from this in two ways: (i) BRAC
subsidizes the apprenticeships through the wage subsidy, making …rms more willing to provide
skills that are not …rm-speci…c; (ii) …rms are contractually required by BRAC to provide sector-
speci…c skills to workers (Figure A2). As the subsidy likely remains below the full cost of training,
this reinforces the notion that a key reason for low take-up by …rms is that the FT treatment
imposed a costly requirement on …rm owners to provide training, that was monitored and enforced.
The …nal dimension we consider probes whether VT and FT workers di¤er in the …rm-speci…city
of their skill set at endline. It is hard to directly measure …rm-speci…c skills for our study sectors.
We thus approach this issue using data from the endline survey where we asked employed workers
whether they considered their skills to be transferable across …rms. As Column 5 shows, relative to
control workers, VTworkers are signi…cantly more likely than controls to report having transferable
skills, although there is no statistical di¤erence to FT workers ( = 264). This is again consistent
with the earlier descriptive evidence in Figure A3, that showed substantial learning for both
sector-speci…c and …rm-speci…c tasks among FT workers.
The key implication from these results is the similarity in long run sector-speci…c skill accu-
mulation in VT and FT treatments. This largely shuts down a channel through which di¤erences
in outcomes across treatments could have been generated, and reinforces the idea that such dif-
ferences stem from the greater certi…ability of skills obtained through vocational training.
3.4 Employment and Earnings
Table 3 presents ITT estimates for labor market outcomes, starting with the extensive margin
of being in paid employment. Column 1 shows that, averaged over the three post-intervention
survey waves, both forms of worker training raise employment probabilities: workers assigned to
FT and VT treatments are 6pp and 9pp more likely to be employed, corresponding to 14% and
21% impacts over controls, whose unemployment rate is 56%. Hence, these ITT impacts of both
training routes on youth unemployment rates are economically signi…cant.
On the total e¤ect margin, Column 2 shows VT and FT workers signi…cantly increase the
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months worked in the year by 88 and 52, respectively, corresponding to 19% and 11% increases
over controls. Hence, through the o¤er of either training route, young workers increase their
labor market attachment. For VT workers, Column 3 shows this is further enhanced by them
signi…cantly increasing their weekly hours worked. This is evidence that the VT treatment has a
stronger impact on employment.
Column 4 combines extensive margin and total e¤ect margin e¤ects to derive ITT impacts on
total monthly earnings. Averaged over all post-intervention waves, the ITT earnings impact for
VT workers is an increase of 25% over the control group. In contrast, there is no ITT earning
impact for FT workers, and the di¤erence in earnings between VT and FT is statistically signi…cant
( = 048). Hence from a social planner’s point of view, the use of wage subsidies attached to
workers does not – on average – lead to earnings gains for those workers.
Column 5 combines these multiple labor market outcomes into one index following Anderson
[2008], so accounting for the covariance structure in components, and we normalize by the standard
deviation of the index in the control group to ease interpretation. The labor market index rises
signi…cantly for both FT and VT workers, with the magnitude being slightly larger for VT workers,
because such workers have improved outcomes along all four components. However, all the …ndings
point to both groups of worker increasing their labor market attachment: by being more likely
to work, and by supplying more labor over time. This notion is reinforced by the fact that for
both FT and VT workers, increases in employment are driven by increases in wage, not casual,
employment. Following up on this, we consider whether workers are employed in their sector of
training (for VT workers), or the …rm sector they were matched to (for FT workers), or their …rst
or second preferred sectors of employment (for controls). Column 6 shows: (i) for VT workers,
this likelihood rises by 167%; (ii) for FT workers this rises by 67%; (iii) the di¤erence between VT
and FT workers is signi…cant ( = 000).
Of course some of the di¤erences in ITT impacts might be driven by di¤erential compliance
between VT and FT treatments. To account for this and also map to theories of training, Table
4 presents ATE estimates for the same outcomes. The treatment e¤ects are similar between VT
workers that started vocational training, and FT workers that were hired and trained by …rms
incentivized by wage subsidies. The overall labor market index shows no di¤erence in ATEs
between FT and VT training ( = 202). Indeed, taking into account the di¤erential compliance,
the point estimate on the labor market index is actually higher for FT workers. This is driven by
FT workers having a higher likelihood of any paid work, and a higher number of months worked
on average over the three-year follow-up period – reversing the ranking from the ITT estimates.
The ATE estimates on monthly earnings in Column 4 show high experimental returns to
vocational training: 42%, averaged over the post-intervention period. This begs the question of
why workers do not themselves invest in vocational training given such returns? One explanation
is credit constraints: as documented earlier, worker monthly earnings at baseline are $6, while the
vocational training costs over $400.
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An alternative explanation is that workers have incorrect beliefs about the returns to vocational
training. In Appendix A.2 we assess this using information collected from workers at baseline over
their expected probability of …nding work, and their expected earnings conditional on employment,
if they received vocational training. We …nd that workers expect the returns to vocational training
to be nearly 200%, many times more than the ATE estimate of returns, at 42% (Table A8). In
short, workers are overly optimistic with regards to the returns to vocational training, and such
expectations do not explain their lack of investment in their own human capital.
Appendix A.3 presents robustness checks on our baseline ITT …ndings.
3.5 Dynamics
3.5.1 Retention
Examining dynamic responses across treatments allows us to bridge to the job ladder model that
assumes workers are in steady state. To begin with we consider retention rates among apprentices.
In each survey wave we asked workers hired under the FT treatment if they were still employed
at the same …rm they were originally matched to. Figure A5 plots the survival function for them:
among those actually hired, 57% are employed for at least 6 months. Yet, their tenure does not
last much longer: the average duration of employment at the matched …rm, conditional on being
strictly higher than six months is 9 months. Crucially, by endline, almost none of these workers
remain in the …rm they were originally matched to. The fact that apprentices have relatively short
employment spells at their matched-to …rm suggests the FT treatment provided them skills that
could be less …rm-speci…c than if …rms had borne the cost of training or not been contractually
obliged by BRAC to provide training. The fact that FT workers transition away from …rms they
were trained by after the wage subsidy expires further limits any additional degree of …rm-speci…c
skills they accumulate relative to VT workers. Figure A5 also shows survival functions for the
…rst employment spell among VT and control workers: both groups have considerably longer …rst
employment spells than workers hired in the FT by …rms incentivized through a wage subsidy.
3.5.2 Dynamic Treatment E¤ects
Figure 3 shows quarterly dynamics of: (i) number of months worked (Panel A); (ii) total earnings
(Panel B); (iii) average hourly wage in wage employment (conditional on being employed). For
each outcome, the left hand panel shows the descriptive evolution of the outcome, and the right
hand panel provides dynamic treatment e¤ect estimates for these quarterly outcomes.
On the dynamics of quarterly employment (Panel A) we see that FT workers …nd employment
more quickly than VTworkers, but over time their employment rate converges to the control group,
while employment rates for VT workers increase over time. This reversal of fortune between FT
and VT is shown clearly in the dynamic ITT e¤ects in the right hand panel. The dynamic
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treatment e¤ects on employment show that transition rates are stable by the fourth quarter of
2015. This underpins the assumption workers are in steady state for the structural model.
On the dynamics for quarterly earnings (Panel B), again FT workers do well initially but then
over time, their earnings fall behind those of VT workers. In contrast, VT workers steadily increase
their earnings (the gradient is near linear) and diverge away from the control group over time.
Hence, the earlier documented similarity in treatment e¤ects between FT and VT when aver-
aged over post-intervention survey waves is driven by the earlier quarters in which FT workers were
hired by …rms incentivized through wage subsidies. Subsequent to that, the patterns of employ-
ment and earnings di¤er across VT and FT workers, with FT workers having similar employment
pro…les as control workers.
Panel C shows quarterly hourly wages (conditional on employment). Conditional hourly earn-
ings for FT and VT workers rise relative to controls, and are not di¤erent from each other. For FT
workers, hourly wages rise by 12% relative to controls, and for VT workers they rise by 11%. To
understand these wage impacts we note the earlier results that sector-speci…c skills accumulation
is similar among complier FT and VT workers. Hence, on-the-job productivity and wages should
be similar for young workers entering the labor market through either training route.
4 Job Ladder Model
4.1 Set-up
The labour market features a continuum of measure 1 of risk neutral workers. Time is continuous
and we assume workers have reached their steady state labor market trajectories by the end of
our study period, as suggested by Figure 3. Workers are heterogeneous in two dimensions: their
training (treatment) status,  (where  =   ,  or ), and the amount of e¤ective labor 
they supply each period given their training status  . We later relate a worker’s e¤ective labor to
their sector-speci…c skills. Given the treatment e¤ects on skills, we assume that relative to control
workers,  is increasing in training  , and is fully transferable across …rms. Conditional on  ,
 is assumed …xed so there is no human capital accumulation over and above that provided by
training. We can thus think of  as characterizing a worker’s …xed productivity or type. The cross
sectional distribution of  conditional on training is denoted (j ), with density (j ).
Following van den Berg and Ridder [1998] and Barlevy [2008], we assume …rms post wage
contracts indexed to worker type-, namely they post a piece rate  paying a constant price per
unit of e¤ective labour. This …ts our context, where the majority of workers are paid piece rates
in manufacturing and service sectors. A worker of type- employed at a …rm posting a piece rate
 earns a wage  = . We assume the o¤ered piece rate comes from a distribution  () with
density (), and denote the lower (upper) bound of the support of  () as  (). All workers
sample piece rates from this same distribution. The …rm commits to pay  each period until the
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worker is laid o¤ or quits.
Two points are of note. First, the distribution from which piece rates are drawn  (¢) does not
depend on treatment  . Once hired, worker productivity/skill is realized and so higher type-
workers are paid a higher wage (at the same piece rate ) because  = . We relax this assumption
in a later extension, allowing for  (j ): this enables us to investigate, in a very reduced form way,
whether, for example, workers in di¤erent treatments search di¤erently across …rms, who might
then o¤er piece rates from di¤erent underlying distributions. An alternative interpretation of this
extension is a set up in which even once a worker is hired, their skills are not perfectly observable
to the …rm, as in a model of statistical discrimination where skill certi…cates are just a signal of
unobserved worker ability.
Second, …rms play no role in the model. Hence to understand how the results derived from
this partial equilibrium framework map to general equilibrium impacts, we later present evidence
from the …rm side of the experiment. This identi…es how …rms react to treatments along one
key margin: the displacement (or crowding in) of other workers in the economy, that is central to
understanding general equilibrium e¤ects of our training interventions.
4.1.1 Value Functions
Workers can be unemployed or employed each period. Unemployed workers earn zero income each
period of unemployment. 0( ) is the arrival rate of job o¤ers for an unemployed worker with
training status  . The worker takes up this job o¤er if the expected value of the job is higher
than the value of remaining unemployed. With discount rate , the value of unemployment for a
type- worker with training status  is:
(  ) = 0( )
Z ¹
( )
[ (   )¡ (  )]  () (2)
Employed workers of type- earn  =  at their …rm in each period. They face an exogenous
job destruction rate ( ), depending on their training status. This captures both the quality of
jobs and the expected duration of the employment relation. On-the-job search is allowed. 1( )
is the arrival rate of job o¤ers for an employed worker with training status  . She takes up this
opportunity if the expected value of the job o¤er exceeds the current job value.21 A type- worker
with training status  has the following valuation of a job paying piece rate :
 (   ) = + ( ) [(  )¡  (   )] + 1( )
Z ¹

[ (   )¡  (   )]  () (3)
Combining (2) and (3), the key endogenous choice for workers – their reservation wage – solves
21There is an established literature on job ladder search models, the de…ning characteristic of which is always that
workers agree on the ranking of available jobs, hence the notion of a job ladder [Bontemps et al. 2000, Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay 2018].
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the following for a type- worker with training status  :
(  ) = [0( )¡ 1( )]
Z ¹
( )
¹ ()
+ ( ) + 1( ) ¹ ()
 (4)
where ¹ () = 1 ¡  (). Unemployed workers accept piece rates above (  ). We assume
 ¸ (  ), so unemployed workers accept any job o¤er. Employed workers accept piece rates
drawn from  () that are higher than their current one irrespective of .
It is important to be clear on the distinct roles that two sources of worker heterogeneity play
in the model: worker types- (as later proxied by their skills) determine wages conditional on
employment, but do not play a role for labor market transitions. An alternative way to view
this is that we assume skills are immediately observable to …rms upon job o¤ers being made
to workers. Treatment status instead is allowed to impact both worker types and the labor
market transition parameters, 0( ), 1( ) and ( ). In particular, worker types are a¤ected
by skills accumulated during training, and that makes workers more productive when employed.
Transitions are impacted by treatment if this makes it easier for workers to receive job o¤ers, for
instance if treatment facilitates job search by allowing workers to better demonstrate their skills
to employers.22
Finally, note that since transition parameters do not depend on , then the reservation wage
for a type- worker does not depend on , so (  ) = ( ).
We do not explicitly model search e¤ort. Rather this is encompassed within the labor mobility
parameters (0 1) that capture both job search when unemployed, on-the-job search e¤ort, and
underlying factors that drive search e¤ort in these states and di¤er across treatments such as the
certi…ability of skills.
4.1.2 Steady State
We close the model by deriving steady state conditions where for expositional ease we omit con-
ditioning on  . The following steady state relationship characterizes when out‡ows and in‡ows
for unemployment are equal for workers of type-:
0() = [()¡ ()] (5)
() =  + 0
() (6)
where ()() is the unemployment rate for type- workers. This is independent of type ,
which is unsurprising as worker labor market mobility is independent of , and depends only on
 (through ( ) and 0( )). Hence this is also the population unemployment rate.
22By not allowing worker characteristics, except treatment assignment, to impact these transition parameters,
the model does not deal with additional forms of selection into and out of employment.
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As employed workers can search on-the-job, the cross-sectional distribution of observed piece
rates for type- workers (j) di¤ers from the o¤er sampling distribution  (). This is because
observed piece rates are those accepted by workers. For type- employed workers with piece rate
· , the steady state relationship for employment is:
[ + 1 ¹ ()][()¡ ()](j) = 0 ()() (7)
The LHS of (7) is the out‡ow from the stock of type- workers employed at a piece rate less than
.23 The RHS of (7) is the in‡ow into employment from unemployment.
Using these steady state relationships, we can derive the link between (¢) and  (¢):
 () = ( + 1)(j) + 1(j)
 (8)
(j) =  () + 1 ¹ ()
 (9)
where (j) = () is independent of  (given worker mobility is independent of ). We see that
() FOSD  () unless there are no job-to-job transitions (1 = 0), i.e. because on-the-job search
leads to outside o¤ers, there exists a wedge between o¤ered and accepted piece rates.
4.2 Estimation
4.2.1 Data
In each survey, we asked respondents to provide their monthly labor market history since the last
survey. We use this to convert our panel data into a job spells format data set: for each worker 
we construct a complete monthly history of their employment status  2 f0 1g from August 2014,
one year after the end of vocational training, to our endline in November 2016. We assume workers
have reached their steady state trajectories by November 2015. Consistent with the model, we set
one wage per employment spell, , and then estimate transition probabilities between job and
unemployment states ( , , ) using a maximum of two spells since the steady state has
been reached. Hence the model is estimated o¤ the last two survey waves.
4.2.2 Identi…cation
Our survey records ’s wage in each employment spell , . However, the distributions of worker
productivity (), piece rates () and piece rate o¤ers  () are not observed. We tackle these
identi…cation issues as follows. First, the data includes a proxy for worker productivity: their
sector-speci…c skills test score, . We assume measurable skills relate to true worker productivity
23To see this note that of the (()¡())(j) workers employed at a piece rate · , a fraction  have the job
exogenously terminated, while a fraction 1 ¹ () receive and accept an o¤er greater than .
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as follows:  = . Taking the natural logarithm of wages we obtain the following expression for
worker  in spell : () = ()+()+ , where  denotes the piece rate paid to worker
 in spell  and where  captures idiosyncratic measurement error, which we allow for to bring
the model to the data. As  is unobserved, to identify  using OLS we need  to be independent
of . However, in our model training simultaneously impacts worker type- and observed wages
 (because (j) depends on ( ) and 1( )). To correct for this omitted variable bias, we run
the following regression of wages on skills, controlling for treatment status:
() = 0 + () +
X

 +  (10)
where  is a dummy equal to one if worker  is assigned to treatment , and  = () + .
We estimate this for workers transitioning from unemployment into employment because of the
assumption that workers accept any job o¤er when unemployed.
Table A10 shows estimates of , using the same survey waves we estimate the model parameters
from. Our baseline estimate is b = 263 from Column 1. This falls slightly to b = 245 when we
condition on worker characteristics and strata dummies.24 Given b, ’s measured sector-speci…c
skills (), and ’s wages in employment spell  (), we recover the estimated piece rate for each
worker-spell as ^ = ^ . We thus recover () and use the steady state conditions to estimate
the distribution of piece rate o¤ers,  (). These functions are recovered for each group of workers
(controls, non-compliers, compliers), so we do not impose a common  (¢) across treatments.25
4.2.3 Parameterization
We assume the model parameters have the following parametric form:
0 = 00 +
X

0 (11)
1 = 10 +
X

1 (12)
 = 0 +
X

 (13)
where  denotes worker’s treatment status. In line with SUTVA we assume workers across
treatments do not interact with each other in the labor market. Given di¤erences in compliance
between FT and VT treatments, we treat compliers and non-compliers as separate groups and
simultaneously estimate di¤erent parameters (0, 1, ) and () for each of the …ve groups
24Column 3 adds interactions of the logarithm of the skills test score with treatment dummies: we see both point
estimates are close to zero, suggesting there is no need to include a  £  interaction in (10).
25In not imposing a common  (¢) across treatments, we are implicitly assuming that di¤erences across treatments
arise from measurement error.
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(control, non-compliers in FT and VT, compliers in FT and VT). From the treatment e¤ect
estimates on skills, we expect complier and non-compliers to have di¤erent () distributions. In
the Appendix we detail the construction of the likelihood function. We estimate the parameters
using maximum likelihood using the two-step procedure in Bontemps et al. [2000], recovering
asymptotic standard errors for the parameters.
4.2.4 Supportive Evidence
We provide three pieces of evidence supporting the model structure. First, a key assumption is
that labor mobility does not depend on worker type . We test this in the sample used to estimate
the model parameters. Table A11 shows estimates from an OLS regression of a dummy equal to
1 if the individual is employed in November 2015, on the worker’s sector-speci…c skills test score,
controlling for treatment status, where the unit of observation is the job spell. Across worker
samples in Columns 1 to 3, there is zero correlation between skills (our proxy for ) and the
likelihood the worker’s initial steady state spell is in employment. Column 4 con…rms this to be
the case when we allow skills to di¤erentially impact this employment probability by treatment.
Second, we test the model prediction that wage growth occurs between, not within, job spells.
Decomposing workers’ wage growth into that occurring within and between job spells, we …nd the
average wage growth of job movers is at least twice as high as that of job stayers, irrespective of
the exact reference period used.26
Third, we take the sample used to estimate the model parameters and estimate ITT regressions
on outcomes closely linked to labor mobility, a key mechanism. The results in Table 5 show that
VT workers experience more job spells (Column 1), and this leads them to gain over two months
of extra employment relative to the control group (Column 2). On the other hand, and consistent
with the dynamic evidence, in steady state, FT workers do not experience more job spells and
are not employed for longer than the control group. These di¤erences between VT and FT are
signi…cant at the 1% level.
We further see that while VT workers are more likely to be employed in the …rst spell in
steady state (Column 3), VT workers who are unemployed in the …rst spell are signi…cantly more
likely than control workers to transition to employment (Column 4). The estimate in Column 4
relates to 0, and shows the positive treatment e¤ect on the number of work spells for VT workers
in Column 1 is not only driven by them being more likely to be initially employed in the …rst
26To decompose worker’s wage growth, we …rst exploit the fact that for each job spell we have information on
the wage in the …rst month and the last month of the spell. We then choose some reference date and linearly
interpolate wages from the …rst and last month of the spell ongoing at the reference date. We then calculate the
wage growth between two reference dates (e.g. between April 2015 and April 2016) for: (i) workers employed in the
same job throughout the reference period (job stayers); (ii) workers who change job at least once in the reference
period (job movers). To avoid sensitivity to outliers, the top 1% of wages are excluded. Self-employed workers and
workers with at least one unemployment spell in the reference period are excluded. We then take the ratio of the
average wage growth of the job movers to job stayers. Using the reference period of April 2015 to April 2016 this
ratio is 206 (the ratio of medians is 231).
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spell. Again, we …nd no impact of FT on transitions away from unemployment, and the di¤erence
between FT and VT workers is signi…cant at the 5% level.
Finally, in Columns 5 and 6 we estimate treatment e¤ects relating to 1 and  respectively.
Column 5 shows no signi…cant impact of treatments on the number of transitions conditional on
being employed in the …rst spell. Column 6 shows that conditional on being employed in the …rst
spell, FT workers have signi…cantly fewer transitions into unemployment, but we are unable to
reject this estimate is di¤erent for VT workers ( = 274).
While suggestive of the mechanisms that might be at play, these estimates do not map exactly
into structural parameters, and so cannot be easily interpreted. We therefore move to presenting
the full set of model parameter estimates.
5 Model Estimates
5.1 Parameters
Table 6 presents the baseline results. Panel A shows the mean worker type  and parameter
estimates (b, b0, b1) for controls (Column 1), non-compliers in each training arm (Columns 2
and 3), and compliers in each training arm (Columns 4 and 5). This con…rms the distribution of
worker types  has higher means for compliers from either training route (265, 258), with both
being at least 10% higher than the mean type- among controls and non-compliers (231, 228,
235). We next note that job destruction rates  are identical for FT and VT workers (023). To
the extent that  captures job quality, this is consistent with the similar skills acquired through
both training routes leading to similar job qualities.
On labor mobility, for the arrival rate of job o¤ers when unemployed (0): (i) controls and non-
compliers have similar estimates; (ii) remarkably, the arrival rate of job o¤ers when unemployed
is almost identical for complier …rm-trained workers and control workers (b0 = 019, 020): the
additional skills and labor market experience gained by …rm-trained workers count for little if they
fall o¤ the job ladder into unemployment; (iii) complier VT workers have transition rates 40%
higher than complier FT workers. These 0 estimates are statistically di¤erent from each other
( = 082), b0(  ) is also statistically higher than for the control group ( = 004). On job o¤er
arrival rates when employed (1) among compliers, we see that VT workers have arrival rates 22%
higher than FT workers, although this is not statistically di¤erent ( = 365).
Among trained workers, the di¤erence in labor mobility of vocationally trained workers relative
to …rm-trained workers is the higher rate of UJ transitions: when unemployed, VT workers get
back onto the job ladder more quickly. This pattern of mobility is in line with VT workers having
more certi…able skills than FT workers, and this certi…ability having especially high returns when
workers are unemployed. When employed, the certi…ability of skills matters less because potential
employers have a signal of a worker’s skills because they are already employed. Hence JJ transitions
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play less of a role in explaining di¤erences between training routes.27
Finally, we note the overall similarity in parameter estimates between controls and non-
compliers on nearly all dimensions in Panel A: this reinforces the idea that compliance is essentially
exogenous, in line with the earlier discussion.28
5.2 Unemployment, Wages and Earnings
Panel B shows impacts on key labor market statistics for workers. Beneath each we report the
percentage impact relative to controls. The …rst row measures the intensity of inter…rm compe-
tition for workers (labor market tightness): this is the number of outside o¤ers received before
being laid o¤: 1  Inter-…rm competition for complier VT workers is slightly higher than for FT
workers, driven by VT workers receiving slightly more outside job o¤ers when employed. Relative
to controls, inter…rm competition for complier VT workers rises by 19%. This is in line with the
earlier ATE estimates on skills accumulation, that showed VT workers reporting more transfer-
able skills across …rms. In contrast, the steady state inter…rm competition for FT workers is very
similar to control workers.
Both training routes substantially reduce youth unemployment rates for compliers relative to
controls. FT compliers have 10% lower unemployment rates in steady state; for VT compliers
the reduction is 23%. Both impacts are of economic signi…cance given the high levels of youth
unemployment in Uganda. Unemployment durations fall for both sets of compliers, but this fall is
far larger for VTworkers (32%vs. 52%): this is because of the signi…cantly greater unemployment-
to-job mobility of VT workers, so they more quickly get back onto the job ladder if they fall into
unemployment (recall job destruction rates are identical across compliers).
Ultimately, what we are concerned with is whether workers transition to better paying jobs.
These results are shown in Panel C. To derive these earnings impacts, we take the appropriately
weighted mean of the kernel density estimate of each group speci…c  (), to impose a common
 (). We invert this using the steady-state relationships (8) and (9) to obtain (j¢) and (j¢)
distributions for each group of workers.
Panel C shows that when unemployed, the mean o¤ered wage for control and non-complier
workers are similar. This is in line with the assumption unemployed workers accept any job o¤er,
and with the estimated mean type  being similar across controls and non-compliers. In contrast,
steady state wages o¤ered to complier FT and VT workers are substantially higher: this is because
these workers are more skilled, so even if …rms draw from the same piece rate distribution  (),
27These results are also consistent with a world in which job interviews are e¤ective but costly, and skill certi…cates
reduce the cost of conducting an interview. Hence FT workers and VT workers have the same probability of hire
(and the same wage o¤er) conditional on being interviewed (because they have the same skills) but VT workers
are more likely to get an interview because they have certi…cates.
28The p-values from F-tests of the joint signi…cance of the (, b, b0, b1) parameters between VT and FT non-
compliers, and Controls are 314, 971, 932 and 774 respectively.
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this translates into higher wages for workers because of the complementarity between piece rates
and skills ( = ). Of course, workers only accept job o¤ers if the value of the o¤ered job is
greater than their current one. The mean accepted wage for complier VT and FT workers is
thus much higher than o¤ered wages, but not much di¤erent between the two (731 versus 718).
This is in line with the skills of both trained workers being similar, so earnings conditional on
employment are similar. The impact of training on skills also explains why accepted wages for
compliers are higher than for controls/non-compliers. The …nal row in Panel C shows that the
steady state annual earnings (unconditional) of complier VT workers rise by 55% over controls,
while the earnings of complier FT workers rise by just over half of that, 31%.
Combining these results precisely explains the dynamic treatment e¤ects: vocational trainees
pull away from FT workers in their employment rates and earnings (Panels A and B in Figure
3) because they are more likely to get back onto the job ladder if they fall into unemployment.
These dynamics are not so much due to any greater job-to-job mobility, suggesting the returns to
skills certi…ability are higher when unemployed. Moreover, compliers across training routes move
as far up the job ladder as each other – wages conditional on employment are similar for complier
VT and FT workers because their skills are similar (Panel C in Figure 3). The key distinction is
that VT workers are more likely to get back onto the job ladder if they fall o¤ it.
Two further points are of note. First, it is useful to contrast the experimental and model
estimates of the returns to training. To be clear, these are not estimated from the same samples,
but the former informs us about dynamics to the steady state, and the latter informs on the nature
of the steady state. The estimated returns to vocational training in steady state for compliers
(55%) are higher than the ATE estimate (42%). In contrast, the steady state returns to …rm-
provided training (31%) are lower than the experimental returns (48%). This contrast arises
because the steady state calculations account for the lower UJ transition rates of FT workers. In
steady state they get back on the job ladder at the same rate as controls, slowly closing the gap
between them in terms of employment rates.29
Second, controls and non-compliers have the highest job arrival rates when employed (Panel A,
Columns 1 to 3). These selected groups of less skilled workers that …nd employment churn between
jobs at a high rate, but they do not progress up the job ladder. To see that note that, within
treatment, the accepted wage for non-compliers is on average lower than for compliers: hence they
do not move far up the job ladder despite higher JJ mobility and inter…rm competition (especially
for VT non-compliers). This is because unskilled workers do not improve their type over time,
say through skills accumulation. Hence, as shown in the …nal row of Table 6, ultimately the
steady state earnings impact is almost identical between controls and non-compliers (remaining
29An alternative hypothesis for these dynamics is that the training routes di¤er in how they enable workers to
learn-how-to-learn, rather than enhancing their productive capacity per se [Neal 2018]. Dynamic impacts are then
driven by intertemporal complementarity in worker’s capacity to learn. We partially explore this hypothesis by
estimating whether workers cognitive abilities, and other preference parameters, change di¤erentially by training
route. We …nd no evidence of such mechanisms.
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well below earnings impacts for either complier groups).
In Appendix A.4 we present robustness checks where we: (i) allow piece rates to be drawn
from treatment speci…c functions  (j ); (ii) show how our results vary when using the highest
and lowest b’s across speci…cations in Table A10.
6 Extensions
6.1 Employment Displacement
To understand how these results can map to general equilibrium impacts, we present evidence from
the …rm side of the experiment, focusing on one key margin: the displacement (or crowding in) of
other workers. The right hand side of Figure 1 summarizes the design from …rms’ perspective. We
focus on the comparison between …rms assigned to the wage subsidy o¤er and the control group
of …rms.30 We estimate the e¤ect on …rms of being o¤ered to meet an untrained worker and a
wage subsidy to hire and train that worker, using the following ITT speci…cation for …rm  in
randomization strata :
 = - + 0 + x0 +  +  +  (14)
 is the …rm outcome of interest in post-intervention survey wave , - is a dummy
equal to one if the …rm is in the FT treatment. We also estimate ATE impacts, where we instrument
hiring a worker the …rm is matched to with treatment assignment. 0 is the …rm outcome at
baseline, x0 are the …rm’s baseline covariates and  and  are strata and survey wave …xed
e¤ects respectively. We cluster standard errors by sector-BRAC branch, and account for attrition
using IPWs, and we also present Lee Bounds. Finally, we examine dynamic impacts by estimating
e¤ects: (i) in the short run, only using the …rst …rm follow-up survey conducted towards the end
of the six-month FT training intervention; (ii) in the long run, averaging treatment e¤ects over
survey waves two to four, that run to years after wage subsidies have expired, and long after any
initially hired workers have left FT …rms (Figures 2 and A5).31
The results are in Table 7. Column 1 shows no evidence of other hires being crowded out
by FT workers in the short run when the wage subsidy is in place. The change in the number
of employees hired almost equals the number of post-intervention hires (Column 2), and there is
no evidence of more workers being …red post-intervention among FT …rms (Column 3). There
30Measuring employment displacement e¤ects of hiring VT workers was part of our original design with the
VT+match treatment, T4. However, as described earlier, take-up rates in this treatment are too low to say
anything about outcomes (even at …rst follow up) for …rms that VT+match workers were hired by.
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x0 controls include owner’s gender and years of education, and …rm size. The strata are BRAC branch and
sector …xed e¤ects. The instruments for the IPW estimates are a dummies for whether the respondent provided a
phone number at baseline, and for whether he/she was an employee of the …rm (rather than the …rm owner or the
manager), the number of network …rms and dummies for interviewers at baseline.
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are also no long-run impacts on employment, hires or …res for FT …rms relative to control …rms
(Columns 5 to 7). The (scaled-up) similarity in the pattern of results between the ITT and ATE
estimates suggest impacts are driven by …rms that hire a worker they are matched to.
Overall, we see little evidence of employment displacement of control workers in the long run
(a result robust to using only the …nal year of data), and there are no net employment e¤ects
of wage subsidies in the long run. Although we can never be certain of the impacts on workers
outside of our evaluation sample, this lack of employment crowd-in or crowd-out in our control
group of …rms in the long-run suggests the partial and general equilibrium employment e¤ects of
the model coincide.32
6.2 Counterfactuals
6.2.1 Understanding the Relative Importance of Mechanisms
We assess the relative importance of the mechanisms at the heart of the model to explain steady
state unemployment rates, earnings conditional on employment, and unconditional earnings.
These mechanisms relate to di¤erences in: (i) arrival rates of job o¤ers (0, 1); (ii) separa-
tion rates (); (iii) skills () that drive worker type . For counterfactual analysis, we hold two
sets constant and allow only the third to vary with treatment. We thus assess the qualitative im-
portance of each mechanism (due to the parameter interactions and non-linearities in the model,
these are not exact decompositions).33
The results are in Table 8. Panel A shows the baseline level of each outcome across controls, FT
and VT compliers (applying to each counterfactual scenario considered). Panel B compares FT and
VT compliers to controls. When equating parameters we set them all to the value in the control
group. Panel C compares compliers in FT and VT to each other. When equating parameters we
set them all equal to the value for VT compliers. We do not conduct this comparison for earnings
conditional on employment as Panel A shows minimal di¤erences along this margin.
On unemployment rates: (i) Panel B shows the impact of …rm-training over controls is mostly
driven by lower separation rates; (ii) Panel C shows that the di¤erential impact on unemployment
32Our two-sided experimental design adds to a nascent literature examining impacts of wage subsidy programmes
on …rms [McKenzie et al. 2016, Hardy and McCasland 2017, De Mel et al. 2019].
33To set the initial conditions for the simulations, we use the parameter estimates in Panel A of Table 6 and
kernel density estimates of  () and () for each group of workers. We construct a common  () function by
taking an appropriately weighted average of the group-speci…c  () functions. We then simulate a panel of 50 000
workers observed over 48 months in steady-state, where workers are randomly assigned to treatment in the same
proportions as in our experiment. As we showed earlier that compliance is uncorrelated with worker observables,
workers are also randomly assigned to take-up their treatment in the same proportion as in the experiment. The
simulation allows ((), , 0, 1) to vary across treatments, and in line with the baseline model, we assume all
piece rate o¤ers are drawn from the same  () distribution across treatments. In each simulation, the average ()
is calculated as the mean piece-rate in the population of employed workers across the 48 months of the simulation.
The average of  () is calculated as the mean piece-rate received by workers transitioning from unemployment to
employment. Final statistics are computed as the average results across 10 simulations.
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of VT over FT is nearly all due to di¤erences in job o¤er rates (explaining 110% of the gap). This
con…rms the central importance of skills certi…cation for youth unemployment in this setting. On
earnings conditional on employment, Panel B shows: (i) the impact of FT over controls is mostly
due to skill di¤erentials, with separation rates being qualitatively around one third as important;
(ii) the impact of VT over controls is mostly due to skill di¤erentials; separation rates are of less
but still non-negligible importance in explaining this di¤erence.
Combining both outcomes, on unconditional earnings we see that: (i) skill and separation rate
di¤erences are equally important in explaining the gap between FT and controls; (ii) all three
mechanisms – skills, separation rates and job o¤er arrival rates – explain the gap between VT and
controls; (iii) the gap between VT and FT workers is overwhelmingly due to di¤erences in job
o¤er arrival rates.
6.2.2 Extending Training to Other Workers in the Economy
We construct counterfactuals considering if the training interventions were targeted to other work-
ers. The issue is relevant because individuals were recruited into our sample based on the potential
o¤er of vocational training, and eligibility criteria targeting disadvantaged youth. As Table A2
shows, relative to labor market active youth in Uganda, our sample is worse o¤ in terms of labor
market outcomes at baseline. Workers in our sample might be especially selected on two traits
relative to other labor market entrants: ability and patience.
The …rst is relevant because our workers are unemployed at baseline with worse labor market
histories. The second trait is relevant because only those prepared to forgo the opportunity cost
of labor market o¤ers during six-months of training would have been willing to apply for our o¤er.
To build counterfactual scenarios targeting youth with di¤erent ability or patience than in our
sample, we exploit the fact that the job ladder model has built in observed heterogeneity of workers
type-, depending on their skill. To begin with, we examine heterogeneous skills accumulation
in FT and VT treatments by ability and patience. In our sample, worker ability is measured by
Raven matrices tests, and worker patience is measured using answers to questions about their
willingness to wait to receive (hypothetical) monetary rewards. For each trait we classify a worker
of being high/low type if they are above/below the sample median.34
Table A13 shows the results on heterogenous skills accumulation. Column 1 highlights there are
di¤erent levels of skill accumulation by high/low ability. This di¤erence is statistically signi…cant
in the FT treatment ( = 072) and marginally so within the VT treatment ( = 116). Hence there
is a complementarity between …rm-provided training and underlying ability in the accumulation
of sector-speci…c skills. As expected, Column 2 shows such complementarities also exist between
…rm-provided training and high/low patience workers, but these are less precisely estimated.
34Patience is measured at baseline. Cognitive ability is measured at …rst follow-up. We verify that there are no
direct treatment e¤ect impacts on these traits.
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We use these estimates to construct counterfactuals assuming: (i) the distribution of worker
types,(), varies by workers with above/below the median trait in controls, complier VT workers,
and complier FT workers (so among six groups overall); (ii) there is a share  of high trait (ability
or patience) workers in the economy; (ii) the parameters (, 0, 1) are the same as in the baseline
model for controls and compliers in each treatment (irrespective of their ability/patience, so traits
only impact outcomes through skill accumulation). We then simulate counterfactual impacts in
the economy varying the share of high-trait workers .
Recall that in the model, worker types- determine wages conditional on employment, but
play no role for labor market transitions, so that unemployment rates do not vary with traits
(or hence ) by assumption. Therefore, we focus on simulated impacts on earnings conditional
on employment, and unconditional earnings. These are in Figure 4 (along with 95% con…dence
intervals). Panels A and B vary the share of high ability workers treated. Panels C and D vary
the share of high patience workers treated.
Panel A shows earnings impacts when employed for FT workers rise steeply in the share of
high ability workers treated. At the extreme, if …rm-training were only taken-up by low ability
workers, treatment e¤ects on earnings conditional on employment would be 5%, and if only high
ability workers were targeted they would be closer to 20%. At this extreme, the point estimate
treatment e¤ect of FT would actually be higher than for VT. Panel B shows that for unconditional
earnings, the impact varies from 20% to 38% as  varies from zero to one.
Panels C and D show less pronounced impacts for patience, but treatment e¤ect impacts for
both training routes are increasing in . This is especially the case for earnings conditional on
employment for FT: if only high patience workers were targeted, then the treatment e¤ects of
both training routes converge to be almost identical at 17%.
These counterfactuals o¤er an explanation for why studies in the literature might di¤er in their
estimated returns to …rm-provided apprenticeships: as  varies across samples in the literature,
the impacts of training vary, and their relative ranking can also reverse.
We use this range of simulated estimates to discuss implied treatment impacts on two al-
ternative groups of worker from our same context. To do so, we draw on worker samples from
related studies with comparable information on the cognitive abilities of workers. First, Bassi and
Nansamba [2019] survey 1000 young workers currently receiving training in similar sectors and at
similar VTIs in Uganda. These trainees have self-…nanced their vocational training. The same
10-question Raven matrices test was used to measure their cognitive ability. In their sample, the
share of high ability workers is 60% (higher than in our sample). Second, Bassi et al. [2019]
survey over 2000 employees in a representative sample of …rms in welding, furniture making and
grain milling sectors, operating in urban areas in Eastern, Central and Western Uganda. Cogni-
tive ability was measured using a subset of the 10-question Raven matrices we used. Using the
overlapping matrices, we …nd the share of high ability workers in this employee sample to be 49%.
Panels A and B in Figure 4 superimpose the simulated impact our FT and VT treatments would
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have had they been targeted to workers self-…nancing their vocational training, or to workers
currently employed in similar manufacturing sectors, under the assumption that the di¤erence
between samples is the share of high cognitive ability workers in each. Two important comparisons
are as follows. First, for self-…nanced VTI attendees, the impacts of VT are only marginally higher
than for our workers. This suggests factors associated with not being credit constrained (and so
allowing workers to self-…nance vocational training as in Bassi and Nansamba [2019]), are not
much correlated to the returns to vocational training. Second, for currently employed workers,
the impacts of …rm-provided training are slightly lower than for apprenticeships in our sample.
This suggests …rms might not be hiring workers optimally, in line with evidence presented earlier
that 52% of SME …rm owners reported the inability to screen workers as a constraint.
7 IRR and External Validity
7.1 IRR
The supply- and demand-side training interventions we evaluate are costly big-push style policies.
Hence, it is important to establish whether the returns are su¢ciently high to warrant a planner
implementing either policy. Table 9 presents IRR calculations for each treatment, where our
benchmark case assumes a social discount rate of 5%, and that the steady state earnings gains
to workers last 15 years. We assume no employment displacement e¤ects of either training route.
For FT workers this is based on the earlier …rm-side results. For VT workers this is an implicit
assumption we make. We present IRR calculations based on steady state earnings impacts on: (i)
all workers; (ii) compliers. The former is most appropriate from a social planner’s point of view.
The latter provides a sense of the private returns to workers if they could overcome constraints to
make these kinds of human capital investment themselves.35
Panel A in Table 9 shows the per intended bene…ciary cost breakdown of each treatment. Total
costs comprise: (i) training costs: the cost per individual of vocational training was $470, while the
wage subsidy amounted to $302 per trainee ($503/month for six months); (ii) program overhead
costs: these vary by treatment depending on whether worker-…rm matches needed to be organized,
the …rm monitored etc.; (iii) the opportunity cost to workers of attending the vocational training:
these turn out to be relatively small (comprising less than 10% of the total cost) because levels of
youth unemployment and underemployment are so high.36
35Table A14 shows the model estimates when we pool non-compliers and compliers in each treatment. Panel A
shows that because of the high compliance in VT, it remains the case that VT workers have higher mean  than
controls ( = 000). The arrival rate of job o¤ers when unemployed is still higher for VT than for FT ( = 069),
and FT and controls have the same b0 estimate. Panel B shows qualitatively similar patterns on unemployment
rate impacts and durations as the baseline model, and Panel C shows overall steady state earnings to be 7%, and
39% higher for all workers assigned to FT and VT with respect to those in Control.
36These cost structures are per intended bene…ciary and do not change across the two sets of IRR calculations
based on all workers or only those that comply with their treatment. This is because we take the view that such
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Panel B shows the NPV of 15 years of earning gains. Focusing on the impacts for all workers
we see that the gains to those assigned to FT are around 18% of those assigned to VT. However,
the bene…t cost-ratio is below one for FT and the IRR is negative. It does not pay for the social
planner to replicate the kind of subsidized apprenticeship o¤ered in the FT treatment. However,
the reason for this negative IRR is the low compliance in the FT treatment. This low compliance
is driven by a lack of …rms taking-up the o¤er of the wage subsidy and the matched to worker.
However, in these labor markets we do observe workers paying …rms for an apprenticeship.
To see why this is so, we redo the IRR calculations but based on the steady state earnings for
compliers – namely those that acquire …rm-provided or vocational training. For those workers
that are hired and trained by …rms under the FT treatment, Column 3 shows the bene…t-cost
ratio is well above one (269) and the IRR is 25%. The rise in IRR for FT workers highlights the
high social returns from being able to overcome …rm constraints in taking-on and hiring young
workers. A core problem remains to design such interventions: this might mean o¤ering higher
subsidy rates, or some other incentive.
For the VT treatment, Column 2 shows that based on steady state gains for all workers assigned
to this treatment, the bene…t-cost ratio is 244 and the IRR is 22%. Even with take-up rates of
68%, vocational training generates high returns, and certainly compares favorably to a menu of
other anti-poverty policies focusing on human capital accumulation. When using the bene…ts
for those workers that actually take-up the vocational training treatment, Column 4 shows the
bene…t-cost ratio rises to 269 and the IRR rises to 33%.
Panel C shows the sensitivity of these IRR estimates to alternative assumptions on: (i) the
remaining productive life of bene…ciaries; (ii) varying the foregone earnings from attending voca-
tional training. We see that the IRR for FT drops o¤ more quickly with shorter productive lives,
while for VT it remains at 57% or above under the alternative scenarios. This is as expected
given the di¤erent wage pro…les to the interventions. The VT intervention always pays for itself
within a decade. On foregone earnings, only under very extreme assumptions does the IRR for
VT ever fall below 5%.
These calculations are based on the cost structure of the NGO BRAC that we collaborated
with. Their overhead costs represent the marginal cost of extending their activities in Uganda
to the training program evaluated. To get a sense of the return of starting such programs from
scratch, Panel D shows what the total cost per individual would have to be in order for the IRR
to equal the social discount rate, focusing on the scenarios where the baseline IRR is positive to
begin with. For vocational training, in Column 2 we see total costs per bene…ciary would have
to increase almost threefold for the intervention to break even. The …nal row performs the same
calculation assuming a 10% social discount rate. In this case the costs for vocational training
would still need to nearly double for the social planner not to intervene.
costs are incurred by the social planner ex ante, prior to compliance being observed.
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7.2 External Validity
In meta-analyses of training interventions in low-income settings, Blattman and Ralston [2015]
and McKenzie [2017] document most interventions have a very low IRR. Figure A6 compares
our ITT treatment impacts relative to the experimental studies discussed in McKenzie [2017], on
employment and earnings outcomes. Our e¤ect sizes are large relative to earlier studies, although
the ranking across treatment types is in line with earlier work. We speculate over …ve reasons why
our returns are high relative to other studies, each of which opens up avenues for future work.
First, our treatments are intensive and of a ‘big push’ variety. Speci…cally, both treatments
last six months, the wage subsidy rate is higher than some other studies, and in the wage subsidy
treatment …rms are contractually obliged to train hired workers.
Second, we worked with a limited set of VTIs, pre-selected based on their reputation. There is
no shortage of VTIs in Uganda, and as in other low-income contexts, there are concerns over a long
tail of low-quality training providers existing in equilibrium. Hence, although our treatments relax
credit constraints for workers, it is not obvious the results would replicate through an unconditional
cash transfer: this would rely on workers having knowledge over training providers. Rather a
conditional cash transfer (conditioned on having to attend one of these VTIs) is likely to have
higher returns. This might explain why similar programs providing vouchers to workers redeemable
at any training provider have had more limited success [Galasso et al. 2004, Groh et al. 2016].
Third, there are design issues: our experiment separates out in-class vocational training from
a wage subsidy program. It also has a precise sectoral focus limited to eight sectors. All workers
receive vocational training in one of these sectors, and all sampled …rms operate in one of these
sectors. Workers were not given free reign over which sector to train in: they had to choose among
sectors with substantial demand for skilled workers. This limited scope for mismatch between
worker skills and …rms they were o¤ered to.
Fourth, only 13% of workers attrit over our four year evaluation, comparing favorably to
other studies. Indeed, in the meta-analysis of McKenzie [2017], all but one study has attrition
rates above 18%. As Figure A6 shows, other studies have similar or larger point estimates, but
more imprecise treatment e¤ects, that might in part arise from attrition. Moreover, our payment
structures to VTIs ensured that the vast majority of workers completed training conditional on
starting it, mitigating drop-out problems that earlier studies have faced.
Finally, workers selected into our sample given the oversubscription design might di¤er from
other young workers. We exploited this fact earlier to build counterfactual treatment e¤ect esti-
mates of targeting our interventions to others workers. Given youth unemployment rates of 60%,
the allocation of talent in the economy might improve if we think of the large pool of unemployed
workers as heterogeneous, and those attracted to the sample through the o¤er of vocational train-
ing as being positively selected relative to the average unemployed youth. It is exactly these kinds
of motivated jobseeker that the economic gains from matching to jobs might be highest for.
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8 Conclusion
Transitions into the labor market mark a key stage in the life cycle, and a body of evidence
documents how initial experiences and …rst job opportunities during this transition have persistent
impacts on lifetime welfare [Becker 1994, Pissarides 1994]. This paper provides experimental and
structural evidence on this transition from a novel two-sided experiment in the context of urban
labor markets in a low-income country: Uganda.
Training of young workers whether through vocational training institutes or apprenticeships has
a particular salience in low income economies for three main reasons: (i) very young populations
imply that transitioning new workers into the labor market is the dominant challenge, (ii) the
quality and duration of schooling is low and therefore young people are ill-equipped to access jobs
in the manufacturing and service sectors of the economy, and (iii) there are limited opportunities
to use forms of tertiary education as a means of transitioning young people into good jobs.
We document that both types of training when provided over an extended period can have
highly positive e¤ects on employment and earnings within disadvantaged youth transitioning into
the labor market. This is in sharp contrast with workers who receive neither type of training
and who remain largely unemployed or employed in casual work, as is common among unskilled
workers across the developing world. What is even more revealing is that the steady state e¤ects on
employment and earnings for VT workers are almost twice as large as those for FT workers. This
result speaks directly to the value of the certi…ability of skills, that is a key di¤erence between skills
gained through vocational training and those gained via …rm-provided apprenticeships. Estimating
a job ladder model of worker search reveals labor market mobility as the main mechanism for the
divergence in employment and earnings pro…les between VT and FT workers.
Two …nal implications of our …ndings are noteworthy. First, as shown in the second coun-
terfactual, the complementarity between cognitive ability and skills di¤ers between FT and VT
treatments. This hints at training being imparted di¤erently at …rms and VTIs: at …rms higher
ability workers learn more, while VTIs appear to ensure more workers gain skills. This is in line
with the objectives of …rms and VTIs, but highlights the importance for policy to account for
di¤erential targeting by worker ability by skills providers in the economy. Second, the cost of
non-certi…able skills is greater in lower income settings because the …rm size distribution is highly
skewed: young workers are reliant on hiring by SMEs that have limited potential for promotion
within …rms, that would be a natural alternative to labor mobility between …rms as the way to
climb the job ladder. Hence policies to relax constraints on …rm size and deepen worker hierarchies
within …rms are a natural counterpart to policies promoting labor mobility across …rms.
These implications open up a rich set of research possibilities for analyzing how vocational edu-
cation might be best organized in these countries, how governments might intervene to incentivize
…rms to provide apprenticeships, to certify skills, and to unlock constraints on …rm growth. Few
areas of research are more important for determining the development trajectory of low income
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countries. With overwhelmingly young populations and inadequate education systems the training
that young workers obtain as they transition into the labor force will be pivotal in determining
whether we end up with a sea of workers in unskilled, informal work or with a growing share in
stable, skilled jobs. At a time when labor markets are undergoing rapid structural change we need
to take up the challenge set by Becker [1964] and Schultz [1981] of working out how best to invest
in the human capital of young workers so that they can secure meaningful jobs.
A Appendix
A.1 Attrition
Table A5 presents evidence on the correlates of worker attrition. Attrition is low, with only
13% of workers attriting by the 48-month endline. Focusing on attrition between baseline and
endline, Column 1 shows that: (i) attrition is uncorrelated to treatment assignment; (ii) worker
characteristics do not predict attrition in general but workers that score higher on a cognitive
ability test are more likely to attrit. Column 2 shows there to be little evidence of heterogeneous
attrition across treatments by baseline cognitive scores. Any bias that might arise from selective
attrition on unobservables cannot be signed a priori. Tracked workers would be negatively selected
if attriters are more likely to …nd employment themselves, or they would be positively selected if
attriters are least motivated to …nd work and remain attached to the labor market. To account
for attrition, we weight our ITT estimates using inverse probability weights (IPWs). We also show
the robustness of the main treatment impacts when using conditional Lee bounds [Lee 2009].
On the IPWs, we proceed as follows. At each survey wave  we de…ne a dummy  such that
we observe ( ) for observations for which  = 1. We then …rst estimate a probit of  on 
for each post-intervention survey wave separately, where  includes: (i) x0: the vector of baseline
covariates used as controls throughout in (1); (ii) strata and implementation round dummies; (iii)
z0, baseline measures excluded from regression analysis: dummies for orphan, anyone in household
has a phone, willing to work in multiple sectors, and; (iv) the survey team the respondent was
assigned to in each survey round (). The underlying assumption is that conditional on ,
 is independent of . ^ are …tted probabilities from this regression using survey wave , and
so at a second stage, we weight our OLS ITT estimates with weights 1^1, 1^2, 1^3.
A.2 Beliefs About the Returns to Vocational Training
An explanation for why workers do not themselves invest in vocational training is that they have
incorrect beliefs about the returns to such investments. We assess this using information col-
lected from workers at baseline over their expected probability of …nding work, and their expected
earnings conditional on employment, if they received vocational training. This is shown in Table
37
A8. Columns 1 and 2 show that: (i) at baseline, workers expect their employment probability
to be 57% (that is optimistic given baseline employment rates of 40%); (ii) workers expect their
likelihood of …nding work to rise by 30pp or 53%, if they receive vocational training. This is also
optimistic given the ATE impact on the extensive margin being closer to 31%.
In terms of earnings, Column 3 of Table A8 reports worker beliefs at baseline, over the average
monthly earnings given their current skill set (assuming they were employed). These correspond
to just under $60. We then asked workers what they expected their maximum and minimum
monthly earnings to be if they received vocational training (and the likelihood they would be able
to earn more than the midpoint of the two). Fitting a triangular distribution to their beliefs we
derive an expected earnings from vocational training. This is shown in Column 4: on average,
workers report earnings would more than double, so a greater than 100% return. This is double
the Mincerian returns shown in Table A3, that are themselves upwards biased. Combining both
margins we see that workers expect the returns to vocational training to be nearly 200%, many
times more than the ATE estimate of returns, at 42%.
A.3 Robustness Checks
To conduct robustness checks we …rst combine multiple labor market outcomes into the same index
shown in Columns 5 of Table 3. Column 1 of Table A9 repeats the baseline ITT estimates as a
point of comparison. In addition to the ITT estimates, we also report conditional Lee bounds on
the treatment e¤ects (where we use the convention that the bound is underlined if it is statistically
di¤erent from zero).37
Columns 2 and 3 split the labor market index by gender. Women have been found to bene…t
more from some training interventions, although this …nding is far from universal [McKenzie 2017].
We generally …nd larger ITT impacts on men. Columns 4 and 5 split treatment e¤ects by sector:
we generally …nd larger labor market impacts in manufacturing. Given the correlation between
gender and sector (manufacturing sectors tend to be male dominated), it is hard to de…nitively
separate out whether the impacts are driven by gender or sector. Fourth, we consider impacts in
labor markets outside of Kampala, where 81% of workers reside: the result in Column 6 largely
replicates the main …ndings.
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the treatment e¤ects to the timing of labor market entry.
To do so, we exploit the fact that we have two batches of vocationally trained workers: the majority
of trainees from the …rst round of applicants started training in January 2013. For logistical
37We bound the treatment e¤ect estimates using the trimming procedure proposed by Lee [2009]. The procedure
trims observations from above (below) in the group with lower attrition, to equalize the number of observations in
treatment and control groups. It then re-estimates the program impact in the trimmed sample to deliver the lower
(upper) bounds for the true treatment e¤ect. The bounding procedure relies on the assumptions that treatment is
assigned randomly and that treatment a¤ects attrition in only one direction so there are no heterogeneous e¤ects of
the treatment on attrition/selection, in line with the evidence in Table A5. As Lee [2009] discusses, using covariates
to trim the samples yields tighter bounds. The covariates we use are the strata dummies.
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reasons, a second round of randomized-in applicants received vocational training between October
2013 and April 2014 (and so receive their training at the same time as when the apprenticeships
are being implemented). In Column 7 we allow the impacts of vocational training to di¤er by
the …rst and second batch of trainees: we see no evidence that workers in the second batch have
di¤erent outcomes as measured by the labor market index.38
In Columns 2 to 7, in most cases the Lee bounds remain signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Finally, the …nal two Columns show the robustness of the main results to dropping all covariates
except baseline outcomes, randomization strata, and survey wave …xed e¤ects, and to additionally
not using IPWs.
A.4 Likelihood
We assume all random events (0 1 ) are realizations of Poisson processes, so the residual
durations are exponentially distributed. As unemployed workers are always assumed to be made
job o¤ers they accept, the unemployment spell hazard is 0. There are two competing causes of job
spell termination: workers can be laid o¤ (at rate ), or workers can make a JJ transition (at rate
1 ¹ ()). Hence the hazard rate of job spells with piece rate  is ( + 1 ¹ ()). Thus, conditional
on initial employment status ( = 0 or 1) and on an initial piece rate 1, the individual likelihood
contributions are the following.
For type- employed workers in treatment group :
(xj = 1  ) = (1j)£ ( + 1 ¹ (1j))(1¡)¡(+1 ¹ (1j))
£
µ 
 + 1 ¹ (1j)
¶
£
µ 1 ¹ (1j)
 + 1 ¹ (1j)
¶

(15)
where 0, 1 and  are parametrized as in (11) to (13), and are therefore functions of the treatments,
(¢) is the density of (¢),  is an indicator for right censoring,  is the duration (in months) of
the spell,  is an indicator for job to unemployment transition, and  is an indicator for job
to job transition.
For unemployed workers:
38To further examine this concern, we also estimated employment rates in August 2013 (when VT workers
were graduating from the VTIs and the FT treatment was being rolled out): we …nd no signi…cant di¤erences in
employment rates between workers assigned to the FT, VT and control groups at that point. Moreover, recall that
in terms of compliance with the FT treatment, the results in Table A7 already showed that being employed in
August 2013 does not predict compliance (so workers that might have found jobs earlier are no less likely to still
take up the FT treatment). This is robust to alternative speci…cations for compliance (Columns 1 to 4 of Table
A7). Finally, descriptive evidence from the process reports collected just prior to the FT intervention shows that in
the great majority of cases, workers were interested and willing to start training at the FT …rms, so that selection
is mostly on the …rm side. Only a handful of workers reported not being interested in meeting a …rm because they
already had a job.
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(xj = 0  ) = 1¡0 ¡0 £ (0j)1¡ (16)
where (¢) is the density of  (¢).
Given there is no selection into employment conditional on training status  , the generic
likelihood contribution of an observation xi given its type  and treatment group  is given by:
(xj ) =
µ 0
 + 0
(xj = 1  )
¶
£
µ 
 + 0
(xj = 0  )
¶1¡
 (17)
The likelihood is an explicit function of the transition parameters , 0, 1, and of both distribu-
tions  (¢) and (¢). The empirical cross-sectional cdf of piece rates among employed workers at
the initial sampling date provides a nonparametric estimator of (¢):
^(j) =
1P
 
X

1(1 · ) (18)
Under the steady state assumptions, the relationship between  (¢) and (¢) provides a nonpara-
metric estimator of the piece rate sampling distribution  , for any given value of 1 and :
^ (j) =
( + 1)^(j)
 + 1^(j)
(19)
We use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters , 0 and 1, and their asymptotic standard
errors.
A.5 Robustness of the Model Estimates
In the baseline model, the distribution from which piece rate o¤ers are drawn  (¢) does not depend
on treatment  : rather, all workers draw from this distribution, but once hired, workers are realized
to be of higher type-, and paid a higher wage (at the same piece rate ). We now allow  (¢) to
also depend on compliance and treatment  . This enables us to investigate, in a very reduced form
way, whether across treatments, workers search di¤erently across …rms in the economy who might
then draw from di¤erent piece rate distributions. An alternative interpretation of this extension is
a set up in which even once a worker is hired, their skills are not perfectly observable to the …rm,
as in a model of statistical discrimination where skill certi…cates are just a signal of unobserved
worker ability.
Table A12 shows these results: only Panel C changes from the baseline model because we no
longer impose a common  (¢) across groups. By allowing for treatment speci…c piece rate o¤er
distributions, we see di¤erences in terms of o¤ered wages, especially for complier FT workers. The
mean o¤ered wage is $42 allowing for  (j ), while it was $49 in our baseline model that assumed
 (). For VT workers the means are far more similar ($47 vs. $48). To understand what might
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drive this, recall the earlier results on FT compliance showed that …rm characteristics predict
whether a worker is taken on and trained by a …rm o¤ered a wage subsidy. Moreover, negatively
selected …rms (those with lower pro…ts per worker) are more likely to hire the worker when o¤ered
a wage subsidy. These results suggest this initial match with a low productivity …rm as part of the
FT treatment might have persistent impacts on the wage o¤ers these FT workers receive in steady
state. This hysteresis shows up in the annual earnings impacts: these are 16% for FT workers,
far lower than the baseline estimate of 31% (for VT workers the estimate of 48% is more similar
to the baseline estimate of 55%). Indeed, the gap in earnings impacts of FT compliers and FT
non-compliers narrows considerably (16% vs. 12%) while the earnings gap is stable between VT
compliers and VT non-compliers. This kind of persistence might be suggestive of directed search
of workers, and is something we study in greater detail in ongoing work [Bandiera et al. 2019].
We also conducted robustness checks examining how the estimates and simulated steady state
impacts change with alternative b estimates: recall this parameter relates to how worker skills
map to worker productivity or type. The baseline results set b = 263 from Column 1 of Table
A10. We can also take the lowest and highest values of b from this table. Doing so reveals a
qualitatively similar pattern of results. In particular, for both low and high b: VT workers have
signi…cantly higher job o¤er arrival rates than FT workers when unemployed. The bottom line is
that for low b the steady state earnings impacts are 30% for FT and 54% for VT; for high b these
are 32% and 56% respectively. As we would expect, a higher b translates into larger earnings
impacts because skills translate into higher productivity and wages.
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Table 1: Baseline Balance on Worker Labor Market Outcomes
Means, robust standard errors from OLS regressions in parentheses
P-value on t-test of equality of means with control group in brackets
P-value on F-tests in braces
Number of
workers
Currently
working
Has worked in
the last month
Has done any wage
employment in the
last month
Any self
employment in
the last month
Has done any
casual work in the
last month
Total earnings in the
last month [USD]
F-test of joint
significance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Workers 1714 .360 .383 .130 .046 .257 5.92
(.045) (.044) (.023) (.013) (.044) (1.11)
T1: Control 451 .381 .401 .120 .038 .296 5.11
(.049) (.048) (.025) (.015) (.047) (1.27)
T2: Firm Trained 283 .369 .387 .103 .064 .266 6.42 {.968}
(.035) (.035) (.023) (.017) (.032) (1.34)
[.979] [.985] [.520] [.096] [.592] [.243]
T3: Vocationally Trained 390 .358 .389 .149 .034 .253 7.29 {.811}
(.032) (.032) (.023) (.013) (.029) (1.26)
[.763] [.990] [.188] [.802] [.265] [.063]
T4: Vocationally Trained + Matched 307 .320 .360 .149 .050 .205 5.25 {.758}
(.033) (.034) (.026) (.015) (.030) (1.20)
[.316] [.747] [.229] [.266] [.070] [.757]
T5: Untrained, Matched 283 .364 .367 .127 .057 .251 5.56 {.996}
(.033) (.034) (.025) (.016) (.031) (1.25)
[.707] [.386] [.821] [.207] [.210] [.721]
{.882} {.908} {.301} {.214} {.433} {.380}F-test of joint significance
Notes: All data is from the baseline survey to workers. Column 1 reports the number of workers assigned to each treatment. Columns 2 to 7 report the mean value of each worker characteristic, derived from an OLS regression
of the characteristic of interest on a series of dummy variables for each treatment group. All regressions include strata dummies and a dummy for the implementation round. The excluded (comparison) group in these
regressions is the Control group. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis throughout. Column 8 reports the p-values from F-Tests of joint significance of all the regressors from an OLS regression where the
dependent variable is a dummy variable taking value 0 if the worker is assigned to the Control group, and it takes value 1 for workers assigned to treatment group j (with j going from 2 to 5) and the independent variables are the
variables in Columns 2 to 7. Robust standard errors are also calculated in these regressions. The p-values reported in the last row are from the F-test of joint significance of the treatment dummies in each Column regression
where the sample includes all workers. In Column 6 casual work includes any work conducted in the following tasks where workers are hired on a daily basis: loading and unloading trucks, transporting goods on bicycles,
fetching water, land fencing and slashing the compound. Casual work also include any type of agricultural labor such as farming, animal rearing, fishing and agricultural day labor. In Column 7 workers who report doing no work
in the past month (or only did unpaid work in the last month) have a value of zero for total earnings. The top 1% of earnings values are excluded. All monetary variables are deflated and expressed in terms of August 2012
prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are then converted into August 2012 USD.
Table 2: ATE Estimates, Training and Skills
2SLS regression coefficients, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
Bootstrap p-values in braces: unadjusted p-values (left) and Romano and Wolf [2016] adjusted p-values (right)
Received On the
Job Training
Position is
"Trainee" Any Skills (0/1) Test Score (0-100)
Measured at: First Job First Job Two-Three Years
after Training
Two-Three Years
after Training
Three Years after
Training, Conditional
on Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm Trained .570 .767 .422 9.67 -.072
(.179) (.123) (.100) (5.29) (.341)
{.001 ; .022} {.001 ; .002} {.001 ; .011} {.087 ; .292} {.831 ; .841}
Vocationally Trained -.048 .015 .407 10.3 .253
(.056) (.029) (.032) (1.70) (.104)
{.426 ; .815} {.591 ; .841} {.001 ; .001} {.001 ; .002} {.049 ; .136}
Mean (SD) Outcome in Control Group .402 .041 .596 30.1 (22.9) -
Control for Baseline Value No No No No No
P-values on tests of equality:
Firm Trained = Vocationally Trained [.000] [.000] [.863] [.902] [.264]
N. of observations 789 797 1,818 1,818 650
Treatment effects on:
Being Trained by Firms Sector-Specific Skills
Notes: The data used is from the baseline and three worker follow-up surveys. We report 2SLS regression estimates, where treatment assignment is used as IV for treatment take-
up. Treatment take-up is defined as a dummy equal to one if the worker (i) started firm training in FT or (ii) started vocational training in VT. Bootstrap standard errors are calculated
using 1,000 replications and reported in parenthesis. We also report unadjusted p-values (left) and p-values adjusted for multiple testing (right) in braces. These are computed using
the step-down procedure discussed in Romano and Wolf [2016], with 1,000 bootstrap replications. The number of hypotheses being tested simultaneously in the five columns is ten
– for each outcome we test the impact of two treatments, FT and VT, and we do so for five outcomes. Therefore, the p-values in columns 1 to 5 are adjusted for testing on ten
hypotheses. All regressions include strata dummies, survey wave dummies, a dummy for the implementation round and dummies for the month of interview. We also control for the
following baseline characteristics of workers: age at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was married at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker had any children at
baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was employed at baseline, and a dummy for whether the worker scored at the median or above on the cognitive test administered at
baseline. In Columns 1 and 2 we use information on the first employment spell reported by a worker in the post-intervention period (so the sample only includes workers that had at
least one job in the post-intervention period). In Column 1 the dependent variable is a dummy=1 if the worker reported having received on the job training at her first employer. In
Column 2 the dependent variable is a dummy=1 if the worker reported being a "Trainee" when asked about her position at her first employer. In Column 3 the dependent variable is a
dummy for whether the respondent reports having any sector specific skills or not at second and third follow-up. In Column 4 the dependent variable is the skills test score, from the
test administered to workers in the second and third worker follow-up. In Column 5 the dependent variable is based on a question on the perceived transferability of the skills learned
at the current firm. This question is asked only to individuals who are working and is only available at third followup. The variable is standardized using the mean and standard
deviation in Control. A higher value of the variable corresponds to more transferable skills. For the regressions in Columns 3 and 4, workers that reported not having any sector
specific skills are assigned a test score equal to what they would have got had they answered the test at random. Workers that refused to take the skills test are excluded from the
regressions in Columns 3-4. At the foot of each Column we report p-values on the null that the impact of the vocational training is equal to the impact of firm training.
Skills
Transferability
Table 3: ITT Estimates, Labor Market Outcomes
OLS IPW regression coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses
Bootstrap p-values in braces: unadjusted p-values (left) and Romano and Wolf [2016] adjusted p-values (right)
Any paid work in
the last month
Number of
months worked
in the last year
Hours worked in
the last week
Total earnings in
the last month
[USD]
Labor market
index
Worked in sector of
training/matching in
the last month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Trained .063 .518 -.196 1.89 .105 .045
(.025) (.259) (2.27) (2.20) (.051) (.015)
{.016 ; .046} {.049 ; .126} {.945 ; .945} {.408 ; .601} {.043 ; .043} {.005 ; .005}
Vocationally Trained .090 .879 3.76 6.10 .170 .112
(.020) (.207) (1.84) (1.80) (.041) (.013)
{.001 ; .001} {.001 ; .001} {.043 ; .126} {.001 ; .005} {.001 ; .001} {.001 ; .001}
Mean Outcome in Control Group .438 4.52 28.2 24.7 .003 .067
Control for Baseline Value Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-values on tests of equality:
Firm Trained = Vocationally Trained [.255] [.134] [.059] [.048] [.169] [.000]
N. of observations 3,256 3,256 2,057 3,115 3,256 3,256
Notes: The data used is from the baseline and three worker follow-up surveys in all columns apart from Column 3. Since hours worked in the last month are not available at first follow-up
(24 months after baseline), Column 3 uses data from the baseline, and the second and third follow-up surveys implemented 36 and 48 months after baseline respectively). We report OLS
IPW regression estimates in all Columns, together with robust standard errors in parenthesis. We also report unadjusted p-values (left) and p-values adjusted for multiple testing (right) in
braces. These are computed using the step-down procedure discussed in Romano and Wolf [2016], with 1,000 bootstrap replications. The number of hypotheses being tested
simultaneously in the first four columns is eight – for each outcome we test the impact of two treatments, FT and VT, and we do so for four outcomes. Therefore, the p-values in columns 1 to
4 are adjusted for testing on eight hypotheses. In addition, we adjust the p-values in column 5 for two hypotheses, that is, for testing two treatments at the same time. We again adjust the p-
values for testing on two hypotheses in column 6. All regressions control for the value of the outcome at baseline (except in Column 2), as well as strata dummies, survey wave dummies, a
dummy for the implementation round and dummies for the month of interview. We also control for the following baseline characteristics of workers: age at baseline, a dummy for whether the
worker was married at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker had any children at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was employed at baseline, and a dummy for whether the
worker scored at the median or above on the cognitive test administered at baseline. In Column 4 the dependent variable is total earnings from any wage or self-employment in the last
month. Individuals reporting no wage employment earnings and no self-employment earnings are assigned a value of zero. The top 1% of earnings values are excluded. All monetary
variables are deflated and expressed in terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are
then converted into August 2012 USD. The Labor Market Index in column 5 is a standardized index of the variables in Columns 1-4, where we use the procedure discussed in Anderson
[2008] to construct the index. In Column 6 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual conducted any work in the last month in: the sector of training (for VT); the sector
of matching (for FT); either the first or second most preferred sectors of employment, as indicated in the baseline survey (for Control). The weights for the Inverse Probability Weights (IPW)
are computed separately for attrition at first, second and third follow-up. The instruments for the IPW estimates are whether the worker was an orphan at baseline, a dummy=1 if anyone in
the household of the worker reported having a phone at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker reported being willing to work in more than one sector at the time of their original
application to the VTIs and dummies for the survey team the worker’s interview was assigned to in each of the three follow-up survey rounds. At the foot of each Column we report p-values
on the null that the impact of the vocational training is equal to the impact of firm training.
Table 4: ATE Estimates, Labor Market Outcomes
2SLS regression coefficients, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
Bootstrap p-values in braces: unadjusted p-values (left) and Romano and Wolf [2016] adjusted p-values (right)
Dependent variable: Any paid work inthe last month
Number of
months worked
in the last year
Hours worked
in the last week
Total earnings
in the last
month [USD]
Labor market
index
Worked in sector of
training/matching in
the last month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Trained .246 2.31 4.13 11.9 .473 .245
(.085) (.917) (7.56) (8.08) (.176) (.062)
{.004 ; .023} {.013 ; .029} {.622 ; .622} {.145 ; .241} {.009 ; .009} {.001 ; .001}
Vocationally Trained .135 1.38 7.12 10.3 .272 .190
(.028) (.302) (2.61) (2.65) (.059) (.019)
{.001 ; .001} {.001 ; .001} {.013 ; .026} {.001 ; .001} {.001 ; .001} {.001 ; .001}
Mean Outcome in Control Group .438 4.52 28.2 24.7 .003 .067
Control for Baseline Value Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-values on tests of equality:
Firm Trained = Vocationally Trained [.141] [.255] [.661] [.830] [.202] [.343]
N. of observations 3,256 3,256 2,057 3,115 3,256 3,256
Notes: The data used is from the baseline and three worker follow-up surveys in all columns apart from Column 3 which uses data from baseline and second and third follow-up, since
hours worked in the last month are not available at first follow-up. We report 2SLS regression estimates in Columns 1-6, where treatment assignment is used as IV for treatment take-up.
Treatment take-up is defined as a dummy equal to one if the worker (i) started firm training in FT or (ii) started vocational training in VT. Bootstrap standard errors are calculated using
1,000 replications and reported in parenthesis. We also report unadjusted p-values (left) and p-values adjusted for multiple testing (right) in braces. These are computed using the step-
down procedure discussed in Romano and Wolf [2016], with 1,000 bootstrap replications. The number of hypotheses being tested simultaneously in the first four columns is eight – for
each outcome we test the impact of two treatments, FT and VT, and we do so for four outcomes. Therefore, the p-values in Columns 1 to 4 are adjusted for testing on eight hypotheses.
In addition, we adjust the p-values in column 5 for two hypotheses, that is, for testing two treatments at the same time. We again adjust the p-values for testing on two hypotheses in
column 6. All regressions control for the value of the outcome at baseline (except in Column 2), as well as strata dummies, survey wave dummies, a dummy for the implementation round
and dummies for the month of interview. We also control for the following baseline characteristics of workers: age at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was married at baseline, a
dummy for whether the worker had any children at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was employed at baseline, and a dummy for whether the worker scored at the median or
above on the cognitive test administered at baseline. In Column 4 the dependent variable is total earnings from any wage or self-employment in the last month. Individuals reporting no
wage employment earnings and no self-employment earnings are assigned a value of zero. The top 1% of earnings values are excluded. All monetary variables are deflated and
expressed in terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are then converted into
August 2012 USD. The Labor Market Index in column 5 is a standardized index of the variables in columns 1-4, where we use the procedure discussed in Anderson [2008] to construct
the index. In column 6 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual conducted any work in the last month in: the sector of training (for VT); the sector of matching (for
FT); either the first or second most preferred sectors of employment, as indicated in the baseline survey (for Control). At the foot of each Column we report p-values on the null that the
impact of the vocational training is equal to the impact of firm training.
Table 5: ITT Estimates, Labor Mobility
OLS regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses
Number of
non-casual
work spells
Total months
of non-casual
work
Non-casual
work in first
spell
Number of UJ
transitions
Number of JJ
transitions
Number of JU
transitions
Sample of workers: All All All Unemployedin First Spell
Employed in
First Spell
Employed in
First Spell
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Trained -.043 -.155 .004 -.013 .008 -.197
(.062) (.735) (.033) (.055) (.076) (.112)
Vocationally Trained .167 2.35 .094 .122 .074 -.092
(.052) (.599) (.028) (.046) (.099) (.090)
Mean Outcome in Control Group 1.03 10.6 .180 .734 .338 .569
P-value FT=VT .000 .000 .005 .011 .461 .274
Observations 1,158 1,158 1,158 894 264 264
Notes: We report OLS regression coefficients, and robust standard errors in parentheses. The dataset is a cross-section of workers built using data from the
second and third worker follow-up surveys. For each worker it contains information on: spell type (employment, unemployment), spell duration (in months),
earnings in employment spells (in USD), dates of transitions between spells and type of transition: (i) job to unemployment, (ii) unemployment to job, or (iii) job
to job. The initial spell is identified as the (employment or unemployment) spell that was ongoing in November 2015. Spells are right censored at the date of
the third follow-up interview (which ended in December 2016). Spells are left censored at 1 August 2014. Casual and agricultural occupations are coded as
unemployment. Self-employment is coded as employment (but self-employment spells are assigned a separate spell). The sample is restricted to individuals
who were unemployed in their first spell in Column 4, and individuals who were employed in their first spell in Columns 5 and 6. The outcomes in Columns 4,
5 and 6 are respectively the number of unemployment-to-job, job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions the worker experienced between November
2015 and the date of the interview. All regressions include strata dummies and a dummy for the implementation round. We also control for the following
baseline characteristics of workers: age at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was married at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker had any
children at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was employed at baseline, and a dummy for whether the worker scored at the median or above on the
cognitive test administered at baseline. At the foot of each Column we report p-values on the null that the impact of the vocational training is equal to the
impact of firm training.
Table 6: Baseline Estimates of the Job Ladder Search Model
Two-step estimation procedure in Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg [2000]
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
Steady State: November 2015 (Data from Second and Third Follow Up)
Panel A: Parameter Estimates (Monthly) Control
Firm
Trained
Vocationally
Trained
Firm
Trained
Vocationally
Trained
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average units of effective labor [USD] 2.31 2.28 2.35 2.65 2.58
Job destruction rate, δ .027 .027 .026 .023 .023
(.003) (.006) (.005) (.007) (.004)
Arrival rate of job offers if UNEMPLOYED, λ0 .019 .019 .018 .020 .028
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.003)
Arrival rate of job offers if EMPLOYED, λ1 .038 .042 .054 .032 .039
(.010) (.019) (.022) (.022) (.013)
Panel B: Competition for Workers and Unemployment
Interfirm competition for workers 1.41 1.54 2.08 1.41 1.68
% Impact: 8.7% 47% -.5% 19%
Unemployment rate .59 .59 .59 .53 .46
% Impact: .26% .70% -9.9% -23%
Unemployment duration (months) 52.8 53.1 56.2 5.0 35.9
% Impact: .54% 6.5% -5.2% -32%
Employment duration (months) 36.8 36.7 38.5 44.2 42.9
% Impact: -.10% 4.7% 20% 17%
Panel C: Wages and Earnings
Average monthly OFFERED wages [USD] 43.1 42.6 43.9 49.4 48.2
Average monthly ACCEPTED wages [USD] 62.6 63.2 7.3 71.8 73.1
Impact on annual earnings [USD] 1.66 34.1 95.4 169
% Impact: .54% 11% 31% 55%
Non-Compliers Compliers
Notes: The dataset is a cross-section of workers, and for each worker it contains information on: spell type (employment, unemployment), spell duration
(in months), earnings in employment spells (in USD), dates of transitions between spells and type of transition: (i) job to unemployment, (ii)
unemployment to job, or (iii) job to job. Wages are deflated and expressed in terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index
published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are then converted into August 2012 USD. The dataset contains at most two
spells (and one transition) per individual. The data comes from the second and third follow-up survey of workers, and the initial spell is identified as the
(employment or unemployment) spell that was ongoing in November 2015. Spells are right censored at the date of the third follow-up interview (which
ended in December 2016). Spells are left censored at 1 August 2014. Casual and agricultural occupations are coded as unemployment. Self-
employment is coded as employment (but self-employment spells are assigned a separate spell). The estimation protocol follows the two-step procedure
in Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg [2000]: in the first step the G function is estimated non-parametrically from the data (so this is just the empirical
CDF of observed wages for those workers that are employed in their first spell), and is then substituted into the likelihood function. In the second step,
maximum likelihood is conducted using information from both the first and second spells for each individual to recover the parameter estimates. As
shown in Panel A, we estimate separate parameters for Control and Treatment groups, and, within treatments, for compliers and non-compliers. Outputs
in Panel B are derived from the model and computed as functions of the estimated parameters: (i) interfirm competition for workers=λ1/δ; (ii)
unemployment rate=δ/(δ+λ0); (iii) unemployment duration=1/λ0; employment duration=1/δ. In Panel C average monthly offered and accepted wages are
computed as the product of average offered and accepted piece-rates, and average units of effective labor. We assume workers draw piece-rates from
the same offer distribution F(r). F(r) is the kernel density estimate of a weighted average of the distributions of offered piece-rates across treatments -
F(r|T) - where such distributions are obtained from their steady-state relationship with non-parametrically estimated G(r|T). Weights are equal to the
share of individuals in each treatment. For each treatment we then re-invert F(r) using estimated parameters and steady-state relationships to obtain
G(r|T) under the assumption that workers draw piece-rates from the same offer distribution.
Table 7: Employment and Other Firm Outcomes
IPW regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by sector-branch in parenthesis, Lee Bounds in brackets
Number of
Employees
Number of Post-
intervention
Hires
Number of Post-
intervention
Fires
Log (Average
Monthly Profits)
Number of
Employees
Number of Post-
intervention
Hires
Number of Post-
intervention
Fires
Log (Average
Monthly Profits)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PANEL A: ITT Estimates
Firm Trained .350 .370 -.118 .011 -.116 -.054 -.093 .113
(.205) (.137) (.160) (.114) (.154) (.077) (.150) (.050)
[.553 ; 1.16] [.430 ; .668] [-.272 ; .111] [-.089 ; .219] [-.133 ; .237] [-.087 ; .176] [-.007 ; .435] [-.069 ; .192]
PANEL B: ATE Estimates
Firm Trained 1.34 1.42 -.453 .036 -.358 -.127 -.182 .313
(.770) (.441) (.623) (.375) (.431) (.229) (.451) (.169)
Mean outcome in Control firms 2.43 .650 1.56 211 2.32 .893 1.41 182
Number of observations 569 569 569 444 1,611 1,606 1,611 1,178
Short Run (first follow-up) Long Run (second to fourth follow-ups)
Notes: The data used is from the firm follow-up data surveys. Panel A reports OLS IPW regression estimates together with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the branch-trade
level in parenthesis. We report Lee [2009] bounds in brackets, where we implement a conditional Lee Bounds procedure that is able to condition on dummies for the interview round and baseline trade.
Underlined bounds are significantly different from zero at the 95% condfidence level. Panel B reports 2SLS IPW regression estimates, where treatment assignment is used as IV for treatment take-up.
Treatment take-up is defined as a dummy equal to one if the firm hired one of the workers it was matched with. All regressions control for the value of outcome at baseline (when available), and include
branch and trade fixed-effects, survey wave dummies and dummies for the month of interview. Baseline controls also include the owner's sex, business age (measured as number of years since the business
was established) and business age squared, firm size and owner's years of education. The weights for the Inverse Probability Weights (IPW) are computed separately for attrition at second, third and fourth
follow-up. The instruments for the IPW estimates are dummies for whether the respondent provided a phone number at baseline, and for whether he/she was an employee of the firm (rather than the firm
owner or the manager), the number of network firms and dummies for interviewers at baseline. All monetary amounts are deflated and expressed in terms of the price level in January 2013 using the monthly
Producer Price Index for the manufacturing sector (local market), published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. The monetary amounts are then converted in January 2013 USD (1USD=2385UGX). Monthly
profits and revenues are truncated at 99th percentile.
Table 8: Counterfactual Analysis on Relative Importance of Mechanisms
Different
Arrival Rates
Different
Separation
Rates
Different
Skills
Different
Arrival Rates
Different
Separation
Rates
Different
Skills
Different
Arrival Rates
Different
Separation
Rates
Different
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Baseline Levels
Control
Firm Trained
Vocationally Trained
Panel B: FT=VT=Control
Firm Trained 21% 76% 0% -39% 33% 100% -10% 56% 54%
Vocationally Trained 72% 29% 0% 3% 27% 74% 51% 30% 29%
Panel C: FT=VT
Vocationally Trained 110% -9% 0% - - - 137% -11% -15%
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates from simulated data generated from the model. We run 10 simulations of the behavior of 50,000 workers followed over a period of 48 months. In
each simulation, we randomly assign individuals to treatment in the same proportions as in our experiment. Workers are also randomly assigned to take-up their treatment in the same
proportion as in the experiment. In each simulation we calculate treatment effects as the average monthly impact of FT and VT on employment and earnings across the 48 months from
OLS regressions. We then aggregate estimates across the different simulations. Panel A shows mean unemployment rate, conditional and unconditional earnings in the baseline
simulations, when we allow arrival rates λ0 and λ1, separation rates δ and the distribution of effective units of labor h(ε) to vary across Control and treatment groups. Panel B shows
percentage changes in treatment effects beween the baseline and the counterfactual simulations when we set the parameters indicated at the top of the table for individuals in the FT, VT
groups to be the same as for the Control group. In Panel C we set the parameters of FT workers to be equal to those of VT workers. So, in Panel C the parameters of individuals in VT
and Control remain the same as in the baseline simulation. In Columns 1, 4 and 7 we set arrival rates λ0 and λ1 to be equal across treatments. In Columns 2, 5 and 8 we set separation
rates δ to be equal across treatments. In Columns 3, 6 and 9 we set the distribution of effective units of labor h(ε) to be equal across treatments. The percentages in Panel B are
calculated as the percentage change in FT and VT coefficients between baseline and counterfactual simulation. The percentages in Panel C are instead calculated as the percentage
change in the difference between the VT and FT coefficients in the baseline and counterfactual simulations.
Unemployment Earnings Conditional onEmployment Unconditional Earnings
.589
.531
.456
64.0
73.4
74.4
26.3
34.4
40.5
Table 9: Internal Rate of Return
Firm Trained VocationallyTrained Firm Trained
Vocationally
Trained
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social discount rate = 5%
Remaining expected productive life of beneficiaries 15 years 15 years 15 years 15 years
Panel A. External parameters
Total cost per individual at year 0 [USD]: 368 510 368 510
(i) Training costs (for 6 months) 302 470 302 470
(ii) Program overheads costs 31 4 31 4
(iii) Foregone earnings (for 6 months) - average at baseline 36 36 36 36
Panel B. Estimated total earnings benefits
1 NPV change in steady state earnings (from model estimates) 222 1246 990 1753
2 Benefits/cost ratio .604 2.44 2.69 3.44
3 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) -.017 .224 .250 .327
Sensitivity to different expected remaining productive life of beneficiaries
Remaining expected productive life = 10 years -.088 .196 .225 .309
Remaining expected productive life = 5 years -.308 .057 .093 .196
Sensitivity to different earnings
Foregone earnings = 90th percentile at baseline (120USD) -.040 .187 .196 .277
Foregone earnings = double 90th percentile at baseline (241USD) -.065 .146 .144 .225
Foregone earnings = max earnings at baseline (794USD) -.127 .047 .031 .102
Foregone earnings = double max earnings at baseline (1588USD) -.169 -.017 -.035 .027
5 Total cost per individual at year 0 [USD] - 1246 990 1753
Sensitivity to different discount rates/time horizons
Social discount rate = 10% - 913 726 1285
Panel C. Sensitivity
Panel D. Program Costs for IRR to equate social discount rate
All Workers Compliers
Notes: The Vocationally Trained group combines both T3 and T4. Forgone earnings are calculated as the average monthly earnings at baseline (6 USD) multiplied by six (as the duration of both types of
training was six months). The computation of the IRR uses as input for the benefit the ITT and ATE impacts of Firm and Vocational Training on annual income from the structural model. All monetary
variables are deflated and expressed in terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are then converted
into August 2012 USD.
Figure 1: Experimental Design
A. Worker Side Design B. Firm Side Design
Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the number of applicants originally assigned to each treatment, and the number of firms assigned to each treatment.
Vocational
Training
No Vocational
Training
1714
Workers
T3: Vocationally Trained
(390 workers)
T4: Vocationally Trained + Matched
(307 workers, 256 firms)
T5: Untrained, Matched
(283 workers, 513 firms)
T2: Firm-trained (wage subsidy + matched)
(283 workers, 257 firms)
T1: Control
(451 workers)
1538
Firms
T1: Control
(512 firms)
Notes: The timeline highlights the dates relevant for the main batch of worker applications and baseline surveys. A second smaller round of applications and
baseline surveys were conducted in May and June 2013. The majority of trainees from the first round of applicants started training in January 2013, as shown
in the timeline. For logistical reasons, a smaller group received training between April and October 2013. The trainees from the second round of applications
received vocational training between October 2013 and April 2014. VTI surveys were collected towards the end of the training period while trainees were still
enrolled at the VTIs. Workers from the second round of applicants were not included in the Tracker Survey. The remaining interventions (the matching
treatments and firm training placements) and all follow-up surveys were conducted at the same time for workers from the first and second round of applicants.
On the firms' timeline, the firm level interventions include: Matching, Vocational Training + Matching, and Firm Training. There were two rounds of Matching
and Vocational Training + Matching interventions, in line with the two batches of trainees from the vocational training institutes. The first round of the
Vocational training + Matching interventions took place in August-September 2013. The second round took place in December 2013-February 2014. The Firm
Training intervention took place in September-November 2013.
Figure 2: Timeline
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Figure 3: Dynamics of Employment, Earnings and Wages
Panel A: Number of Months Worked per Quarter
Panel B: Total Quarterly Earnings [USD]
Panel C: Average Hourly Wage per Quarter in Wage Employment [USD]
Notes: Data is from the first, second and third follow-up surveys. We use information on all employment and self-employment job spells reported by the workers in the
twelve months prior to each survey. So the period considered goes from the fourth quarter of 2013, which is the first quarter covered in the first follow-up survey, until
the third quarter of 2016, which is the last quarter covered in the third follow-up survey. Figures on the left of each panel report average number of months, earnings,
and hourly wages for each quarter. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the end of the Firm Training intervention. Figures on the right of each panel report quarterly
ITT treatment effects of Firm Training and Vocational Training on various outcomes, with 95% confidence intervals. All coefficients reported in each panel are
estimated from the same dynamic treatment effects regression, where the FT and VT treatment indicators are interacted with dummies for each quarter considered,
with robust standard errors. All regressions further include strata dummies, dummies for quarters, and a dummy for the implementation round. We also control for the
following baseline characteristics of workers: age at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was married at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker had any
children at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was employed at baseline, and a dummy for whether the worker scored at the median or above on the cognitive
test administered at baseline. Casual and agricultural occupations are coded as unemployment. Wages and earnings are deflated and expressed in terms of August
2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are then converted into August 2012
USD. The top 1% values of earnings and wages are excluded.
Notes: This shows the percentage impact of FT and VT on conditional and unconditional earnings from OLS estimates run on simulated data generated from the model. The
dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. We run 10 simulations of the behavior of 50,000 workers followed over a period of 48 months. In each simulation, we randomly
assign individuals to treatment in the same proportions as in our experiment. Workers are also randomly assigned to take-up treatment in the same proportion as in the
experiment. In each simulation we calculate treatment effects as the average monthly impact of FT and VT on employment and earnings across the 48 months from OLS
regressions. We then aggregate estimates across the different simulations. We only show estimated impacts on compliers. Each Panel shows the treatment effects when we
vary the share of individuals with high cognitive skills and high patience in the population (from 0 to 100%). To do that, we first divide workers in our data into high/low Raven
matrices using their score on the Raven Matrices test implemented at first follow-up. Workers are assigned to the High Raven group if they scored on or above the median of
the Raven Matrices test. Similarly, workers are divided into high/low Patience using their answers to a series of questions about their willingness to wait to receive (hypothetical)
monetary rewards at baseline. Workers are assigned to the High Patience group if they had a value of Patience on or above the median. We then obtain kernel density
estimates of the distribution of effective units of labor h(ε) for each of these groups. In the simulations individuals are randomly assigned to be High/Low Raven and High/Low
Patience in the proportion indicated on the Figures, and draw their effective units of labor from the corresponding distribution. The crosses indicate the exact percentages of
High Cognitive Skills and High Patience individuals in our sample. These are respectively 53.5% and 48.3%. The triangles and diamonds indicate the percentage of High
Cognitive Skills individuals in two other Ugandan samples from related studies. The first sample - "self-financed trainees" - are youth analysed in Bassi and Nasamba (2019)
and includes trainees that have self-financed their own training. The second sample - "employees" - are employees in a representative sample of firms in welding, furniture
making and grain milling from Bassi et al (2019). The share of High Cognitive Skills individuals is 59.8% in the "self-financed trainees" sample, and 48.5% in the "employees"
samples.
Figure 4: Counterfactuals
A. Treatment Effect on CONDITIONAL Earnings,
Heterogenous Cognitive Skills
B. Treatment Effect on UNCONDITIONAL Earnings,
Heterogenous Cognitive Skills
C.Treatment Effect on CONDITIONAL Earnings,
Heterogenous Patience
D. Treatment Effect on UNCONDITIONAL Earnings,
Heterogenous Patience
VT FT
Table A1: Baseline Balance on Worker Characteristics
Means, robust standard errors from OLS regressions in parentheses
P-value on t-test of equality of means with control group in brackets
P-value on F-tests in braces
Number of
workers Age [Years] Married
Has
child(ren)
Currently in
school
Ever attended
vocational
training
Cognitive
Test Score
F-test of joint
significance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Workers 1714 20.0 .040 .118 .016 .036 .561
(.198) (.016) (.024) (.008) (.018) (.043)
T1: Control 451 20.1 .027 .102 .011 .042 .560
(.211) (.016) (.025) (.009) (.020) (.047)
T2: Firm Trained 283 20.1 .040 .121 .018 .038 .554 {.999}
(.139) (.014) (.024) (.009) (.015) (.037)
[.970] [.271] [.260] [.576] [.897] [.640]
T3: Vocationally Trained 390 20.0 .056 .127 .018 .032 .529 {.849}
(.134) (.014) (.022) (.008) (.013) (.033)
[.781] [.056] [.339] [.553] [.461] [.573]
T4: Vocationally Trained + Matched 307 20.0 .030 .123 .029 .038 .603 {.878}
(.146) (.012) (.023) (.011) (.015) (.037)
[.975] [.128] [.075] [.248] [.792] [.772]
T5: Untrained, Matched 283 20.0 .047 .122 .007 .027 .568 {.937}
(.148) (.015) (.024) (.007) (.014) (.037)
[.429] [.084] [.201] [.468] [.359] [1.00]
{.933} {.243} {.449} {.445} {.752} {.974}F-test of joint significance
Notes: All data is from the baseline survey to workers. Column 1 reports the number of workers assigned to each treatment. Columns 2 to 7 report the mean value of each
worker characteristic, derived from an OLS regression of the characteristic of interest on a series of dummy variables for each treatment group. All regressions include strata
dummies and a dummy for the implementation round. The excluded (comparison) group in these regressions is the Control group. Robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis throughout. The variable in Column 7 is a dummy equal to 1 if the applicant scored at the median or above on a cognitive test administered with the baseline
survey. The test consisted in six literacy and six numeracy questions. Column 8 reports the p-values from F-Tests of joint significance of all the regressors from an OLS
regression where the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking value 0 if the worker is assigned to the Control group, and it takes value 1 for workers assigned to
treatment group j (with j going from 2 to 5) and the independent variables are the variables in Columns 2 to 7. Robust standard errors are also calculated in these
regressions. The p-values reported in the last row are from the F-test of joint significance of the treatment dummies in each Column regression where the sample includes all
workers.
Table A2: External Validity
Means, standard deviations in parentheses
Number of
individuals
Age
[Years]
Gender
[Male=1] Married
Currently
in school
Years of
Education
Ever attended
vocational
training
Has worked in
the last week
[Yes=1]
Has had any wage
employment in the
last week
Has done any
casual work in
the last week
Total earnings from
wage employment in
the last month [USD]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
A. Baseline, aged 18-25 1,608 20.1 .567 .038 .014 9.77 .037 .362 .142 .156 2.60
(1.86) (.496) (.190) (.116) (2.06) (.189) (.481) (.350) (.363) (9.74)
Uganda National Household Survey 2012/13:
B. All, aged 18-25 4,696 21.1 .465 .395 .309 7.42 .062 .681 .293 .512 9.13
(2.32) (.499) (.489) (.462) (3.65) (.241) (.466) (.455) (.500) (28.2)
3,456 21.4 .475 .448 .207 6.96 .064 .902 .389 .679 12.2
(2.33) (.499) (.497) (.405) (3.50) (.245) (.297) (.489) (.467) (32.0)
C. Labor Market Active,
aged 18-25
Notes: We report mean and standard deviation of the characteristics of individuals from three samples: (i) those individuals in our baseline sample aged 18-25; (ii) individuals aged 18-25 and interviewed in the Uganda
National Household Survey 2012/13 (UNHS) conducted by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics; (iii) individuals aged 18-25 and interviewed in the UNHS who self-report being active in the labor market (either because they
are employed or actively seeking employment). The UNHS was fielded between June 2012 and June 2013. Our baseline survey was fielded between June and September 2012. In the UNHS respondents are
considered to have attended vocational training if the highest grade completed is post-primary specialized training/diploma/certificate or post-secondary specialized training/diploma/certificate. In the baseline survey
questions on employment status did not refer to work activities performed in the last week, but to work activities performed at the time of the survey. Therefore, for the baseline survey the variable "Has worked in the last
week" corresponds to the worker being "Currently employed or involved in a work activity". Similarly, Columns 8-10 for the baseline survey are based on the most recent activity performed by the individual, conditional on
him/her saying to be currently employed or involved in a work activity. For UNHS, the outcomes in Columns 8-10 are based on the main activity performed in the week before the survey. In Column 9 casual work
includes occupations that are casual in nature, as well as agricultural occupations. In Column 10 workers who report doing no wage employment in the past month (or only did unpaid work in the last month) have a value
of zero for total earnings.
Table A3: The Mincerian Returns to Vocational Training, by Sector
Share of firms
in sector
% workers skilled
in sector
Coefficient and SE from
worker wage regressions
[USD]
Coefficient and SE from
worker log(wage)
regressions [USD]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Sectors 31.0% 26.2 .515
(3.15) (.045)
Manufacturing
Welding 14.57% 24.9% 34.5 .381
(6.40) (.084)
Motor-mechanics 9.80% 23.5% 16.1 .294
(9.41) (.153)
Electrical wiring 6.37% 41.9% 27.3 .486
(7.60) (.189)
Construction 4.38% 28.8% 11.5 .289
(9.39) (.170)
Plumbing 3.08% 49.1% 60.9 .719
(19.0) (.281)
Services
Hairdressing 39.64% 29.2% 22.9 .444
(5.97) (.069)
Tailoring 14.96% 41.6% 15.9 .898
(9.76) (.182)
Catering 7.20% 40.2% 26.8 .330
(11.6) (.109)
Worker is skilled: self-reported VTI attendance
Notes: The data used is from the Census of firms, which includes 2309 firms and 6306 workers. A worker is defined as skilled if he/she was
reported as having attended formal vocational training at any point in the past. Coefficients and standard errors in Columns 3 and 4 are from a
regression of workers’ total earnings in the last month (or the logarithm of workers’ total earnings in the last month) on a dummy for being a
skilled worker (as defined above). Control variables in these regressions include: employee’s age and age squared, gender, tenure and tenure
squared, firm size, BRAC branch dummies and firm sector dummies. Robust standard errors are reported. All monetary variables are deflated
and expressed in terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated
monetary amounts are then converted into August 2012 USD. The top 1% wages and capital stock values are excluded.
Table A4: Characteristics of Apprenticeships
A. Availability
Worker received on-the-job training at the current firm .498
Duration of on-the-job training [months] 10
B. Payments
In the first month of training, the worker:
Was paid .198
Was unpaid .515
Was paying the firm owner .288
Earnings (conditional on > 0) [US$] (median) 39.2 (40.1)
Amount worker was paying to owner (conditional on > 0) [US$] (median) 51.9 (33.3)
C. Trainers
Who was mainly involved in training the worker:
Firm owner only .457
Other employees only .091
Firm owner as well as other employees .452
Notes: The data is from the first firm follow-up, and the sample is restricted to those workers employed in
Control firms. The sample includes 955 workers employed in 332 firms. All monetary variables are deflated and
expressed in terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda
Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are then converted into August 2012 USD. The top 1%
monetary values are excluded.
Table A5: Attrition
OLS regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses
With covariates Heterogeneous
(1) (2)
T2: Firm Trained -.000 .002
(.026) (.035)
T3: Vocationally Trained -.018 .022
(.024) (.034)
T4: Vocationally Trained + Matched -.011 -.012
(.027) (.036)
T5: Untrained, Matched .013 .014
(.027) (.035)
High Score on Cognitive Test at Baseline [Yes=1] .045 .061
(.018) (.032)
T2: Firm Trained X High Cognitive Score -.005
(.051)
T3: Vocationally Trained X High Cognitive Score -.071
(.047)
T4: Vocationally Trained + Matched X High Cognitive Score .001
(.051)
T5: Untrained, Matched X High Cognitive Score -.002
(.053)
Mean of outcome in T1 Control group .134 .134
Strata and Implementation round dummies Yes Yes
Other baseline characteristics Yes Yes
Test of joint significance of baseline
characteristics
F-statistic 2.35 1.57
P-value .071 .196
Test of joint significance of Treatment X High
Score interactions
F-statistic .79
P-value .529
Number of observations (workers) 1,561 1,561
Worker attrited by endline
Notes: Data is from baseline, first, second and third follow-up of applicants to the vocational scholarships.
Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are reported in parenthesis. Other baseline characteristics
include: age at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was married at baseline, a dummy for whether
the worker had any children at baseline, and a dummy for whether the worker was employed at baseline.
The variable High Score on Cognitive Test at Baseline is a dummy=1 if the applicant scored at the median
or above on the cognitive test administered with the baseline survey.
Table A6: Take-Up of Treatments
Sample of Workers: All Workers Offered Training All Workers Invited to interview Met at least oneFirm
Worker received a
Job Offer
Outcome: % Workers OfferedTraining % Workers Trained
% Workers Invited
to Interview
% Workers That Met
at Least One Firm
% Workers Who
Received a Job
Offer
% Workers Hired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T3: Vocationally Trained 97.9 73.8 - - - -
T4: Vocationally Trained
+ Matched 95.4 63.1 12.7 74.4 58.6 23.5
T2: Firm Trained - - 50.5 80.4 90.4 66.4
T5: Untrained, Matched - - 19.1 85.2 34.8 18.8
Vocational Training Matching and Firm Training
Notes: The data used is from the tracker survey and process reports. The tracker survey was collected in July-August 2013, at the end of the main round of vocational training. Process reports
were collected during the implementation of the firm-level interventions (September 2013-February 2014). In Columns 1 and 3 the sample includes all workers assigned to the respective
treatment groups. In Column 1 only workers that were traced and successfully informed about the treatment offer are considered as having been offered treatment. In Columns 2 the sample
includes those workers who could be traced and were offered the treatment by BRAC staff, and the percentage of workers who took up training includes the workers who completed the 6
months vocational training. For Matching and Firm Training (Column 3) the treatment offer is defined as firms having invited the worker for an interview (so those workers matched to firms that
were not interested in the program are not included, as they were not offered treatment). In Column 4 the sample includes workers who were invited for an interview, in Column 5 it includes
those workers who met with at least one firm, in Column 6 the sample includes workers who received an offer to start at the firm. In Column 6 the percentage of workers who took up treatment
is calculated as the percentage of workers who accepted the offer received by the firm, and so started work/training at the firm.
Table A7: Compliance with the Firm Training Treatment
Dependent variable: worker started training at the firm assigned to in the FT treatment
Worker
Characteristics
Worker and
Program
Characteristics
Worker, Program
and Firm
Characteristics
Firm Fixed
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female .011 -.132 -.108 .019
(.065) (.092) (.094) (.138)
Age .013 .006 .002 .004
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.023)
Any child .017 .039 .073 .058
(.092) (.089) (.084) (.120)
High education -.070 -.043 -.030 -.013
(.058) (.058) (.059) (.086)
High cognitive test score -.081 -.067 -.064 .047
(.057) (.056) (.054) (.089)
Employed -.063 -.068 -.035 -.079
(.060) (.065) (.066) (.158)
Ideal job is wage employment -.103 -.070 -.079 -.032
(.060) (.061) (.060) (.100)
High risk attitude -.054 -.066 -.080 -.040
(.053) (.050) (.048) (.070)
High patience .086 .107 .100 .099
(.055) (.054) (.052) (.089)
Employed in August 2013 .075 .071 .060 .066
(.071) (.069) (.066) (.117)
Second round .278 .251 .147
(.085) (.086) (.132)
Matched to more than one firm -.040 .002 -.288
(.075) (.077) (.187)
Average firm size of matched firms .000
(.020)
Average log profit per worker of matched firms -.119
(.052)
Average log capital per worker of matched firms -.023
(.057)
Mean of dep. var. in control .244 .244 .244 .244
P-value: worker covariates .065 .156 .194 .976
P-value: firm covariates .002
Region of application dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector of match dummies No Yes Yes No
BRAC branch of match dummies No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared .083 .177 .213 .143
Observations 259 259 259 417
OLS regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses in all Columns except
column 4 where standard errors are clustered at the firm level
Notes: We report OLS regression coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) in all columns except in column 4 where
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Data is from the first follow-up worker survey and from the matching surveys, which are
used to construct compliance measures. Compliance is defined as having started training at the firm. The sample includes workers
assigned to Firm Training. The regression in Column 4 is run on a dataset at the match level. So the dataset includes all the scheduled
assignments between workers and firms in FT. The p-values reported at the bottom of each column are from join F-tests of significance
of the worker and firm covariates, as indicated in the table. Risk attitudes and patience are measured with hypothetical survey questions.
All variables termed as "High" correspond to dummies equal to one if the worker had a value of the underlying variable on or above the
sample median at baseline.
Table A8: Worker Expectations
Means, standard deviations in parenthesis
All amounts in 2012 USD
With Current Skill Set If Received VT With Current Skill Set If Received VT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Workers (Baseline Interview) .567 .867 57.8 118
(.288) (.144) (46.9) (71.5)
N. of observations 1,611 1,589 1,243 1,411
Notes: The data used is from the baseline and first three follow-up worker surveys. Columns 1 to 4 report the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of
the average expected probability of finding a job and the average monthly earnings (assuming a triangular distribution of expected earnings) with the current skill
set (columns 1 and 3), or if the worker were to receive vocational training (columns 2 and 4). This is based on all workers interviewed at baseline (across all
treatments). All monetary variables are deflated and expressed in terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda
Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are then converted into August 2012 USD. The top 1% values of each variable are excluded from the analysis.
Expected probability of finding a job
in the next 12 months
Average expected monthly earnings
(triangular distribution)
Table A9: Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable: Labor Market Index
OLS regression coefficients, IPW estimates in Columns 1 to 7, robust standard errors in parentheses
Lee [2009] Bounds in brackets
(1) All (2) Women (3) Men (4) Services (5) Manufacturing (6) Non-Kampala (7) Batches (8) NoCovariates
(9) No IPW, No
Covariates
Firm Trained
.105 .070 .135 .027 .167 .189 .106 .106 .115
(.051) (.077) (.067) (.080) (.067) (.056) (.051) (.051) (.050)
[.026 ; .122] [.067 ; .112] [.005 ; .129] [.022 ; .094] [.034 ; .147] [.097 ; .175]
Vocationally Trained
.170 .134 .196 .117 .214 .198 .179 .170 .179
(.041) (.061) (.055) (.065) (.053) (.044) (.045) (.041) (.040)
[.111 ; .204] [.137 ; .198] [.094 ; .208] [.094 ; .198] [.109 ; .202] [.145 ; .221]
-.050
(.088)
Mean Outcome in Control Group .003 -.115 .092 -.109 .081 -.067 .003 .003 .003
Control for Baseline Value Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-values on tests of equality:
Firm Trained = Vocationally Trained [.169] [.362] [.338] [.222] [.460] [.869] [.146] [.175] [.180]
N. of observations 3,256 1,424 1,832 1,320 1,925 2,578 3,256 3,256 3,256
Vocationally Trained x Second Batch
of Trainees
Notes: The data used is from the baseline and first three follow-up worker surveys. We report OLS regressions, where we use inverse probability weighting (Columns 1 to 8) and robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. We report Lee [2009] bounds in brackets, where we implement a conditional Lee Bounds procedure that is able to condition on strata dummies in Columns 1-3 and 6-9, and to condition on region
dummies and a dummy for having a level of education at the median or above at baseline in Columns 4-5. The dependent variable is the Labor Market Index that is computed using the following variables: any paid
work in the last month (dummy), months worked in the last year, hours worked in the last week and total earnings in the last month. Total earnings are set to zero for workers with no earnings. The index is
constructed following Anderson's [2008] approach. Manufacturing sectors are: motor-mechanics, plumbing, construction, electrical wiring and welding. Service sectors are: hairdressing, catering and tailoring.
Workers are assigned to Manufacturing or Service sectors according to stated preferences over their ideal job, reported at baseline. In Column 6 we restrict the sample to labor markets outside of Kampala. All
regressions include strata dummies, survey wave dummies, a dummy for the implementation round and dummies for the month of interview. In columns 1 to 7 we also control for the following baseline characteristics
of workers: age at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was married at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker had any children at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was employed at baseline, and
a dummy for whether the worker scored at the median or above on the cognitive test administered at baseline. Columns 1 and 4-9 further control for a complete set of strata dummies. Columns 2 and 3 further
control for region dummies, and a dummy for having a level of education at the median or above at baseline. The weights for the IPW estimates are computed separately for attrition at first, second and third follow-
up. The instruments for the IPW estimates are whether the worker was an orphan at baseline, a dummy if anyone in the household of the worker reported having a phone at baseline, a dummy for whether the
worker reported being willing to work in more than one sector at the time of their original application to the VTIs and dummies for the survey team the worker’s interview was assigned to in each of the three follow-up
survey rounds. At the foot of each Column we report p-values on the null that the impact of the vocational training is equal to the impact of firm training (T2=T3). All monetary variables are deflated and expressed in
terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are then converted into August 2012 USD.
Table A10: Alpha
OLS regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parenthesis
Sample: All Treatments,U2J
All Treatments,
U2J
All Treatments,
U2J
Outcome Variable: Actual Earnings Actual Earnings Actual Earnings
(1) (2) (3)
Ln (Skills Test Score) .263 .245 .279
(.149) (.163) (.273)
Vocationally Trained X Ln(Skills Test Score) -.024
(.346)
Firm Trained X Ln(Skills Test Score) -.021
(.428)
Baseline Controls No Yes No
N. Observations 162 161 162
Ln (Earnings in First Month of Employment)
Notes: The data is from the second and third follow-up survey of workers and includes information on all job
spells workers have been involved in starting from November 2015. The unit of observation for the analysis is the
job spell. The table shows coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) from an OLS regression of the
logarithm of earnings in the first month of employment on the logarithm of the score obtained by the worker in a
sector-specific skills test. The sample includes workers who transitiond from unemployment into employment. All
regressions control for treatment dummies. In Column 2 we also control for age, gender and education at
baseline, as well as strata dummies. In Column 3 we add interactions of the logarithm of the skills test score with
treatment dummies.
Table A11: Effect of Skills on Employment
Dependent variable: =1 if worker is employed in November 2015
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Unit of observation: worker spells
Worker sample: AllTreatments
All
Treatments
Control
Group
All
Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skills Test Score .001 .001 -.000 -.000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Vocationally Trained X Skills Test Score .001
(.001)
Firm Trained X Skills Test Score .001
(.002)
Baseline Controls No Yes No No
N. Observations 1,289 1,274 396 1,289
Notes: The data is from the second and third follow-up survey of workers and includes information on all job spells
workers have been involved in starting from November 2015. The unit of observation for the analysis is the job spell. The
table shows coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) from an OLS regression of a dummy equal to 1 if the
individual was employed in November 2015 on the score obtained by the worker in a sector-specific skills test. The
sample in Columns 1 and 2 includes individuals from all treatment groups, while the sample in Column 3 is restricted to
workers in the Control group. The regressions in Columns 1, 2 and 4 control for treatment dummies. In Column 2 we
also control for age, gender and education at baseline, as well as strata dummies.
Table A12: Estimates in the Job Ladder Search Model, with F(r|T)
Two-step estimation procedure in Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg [2000]
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
Steady State: November 2015 (Data from Second and Third Follow Up)
Control FirmTrained
Vocationally
Trained
Firm
Trained
Vocationally
Trained
Panel C: Wages and Earnings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average monthly OFFERED wages [USD] 44.1 47.6 41.5 41.7 46.8
Average monthly ACCEPTED wages [USD] 63.2 70.8 67.1 63.9 71.1
Impact on annual earnings [USD] 37.4 19.1 49.7 150
% Impact: 12% 6.16% 16% 48%
Non-Compliers Compliers
Notes: The dataset is a cross-section of workers, and for each worker it contains information on: spell type (employment, unemployment), spell
duration (in months), earnings in employment spells (in USD), dates of transitions between spells and type of transition: (i) job to
unemployment, (ii) unemployment to job, or (iii) job to job. Wages are deflated and expressed in terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly
consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated monetary amounts are then converted into August 2012 USD.
The dataset contains at most two spells (and one transition) per individual. The data comes from the second and third follow-up survey of
workers, and the initial spell is identified as the (employment or unemployment) spell that was ongoing in November 2015. Spells are right
censored at the date of the third follow-up interview (which ended in December 2016). Spells are left censored at 1 August 2014. Casual and
agricultural occupations are coded as unemployment. Self-employment is coded as employment (but self-employment spells are assigned a
separate spell). The estimation protocol follows the two-step procedure in Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg [2000]: in the first step the G
function is estimated non-parametrically from the data (so this is just the empirical CDF of observed wages for those workers that are employed
in their first spell), and is then substituted into the likelihood function. In the second step, maximum likelihood is then conducted using
information from both the first and second spells for each individual to recover the parameter estimates. In Panel C average monthly offered
and accepted wages are computed as the product of average offered and accepted piece-rates, and average units of effective labor. We
assume workers draw piece-rates from the same offer distribution F(r). F(r) is the kernel density estimate of a weighted average of the
distributions of offered piece-rates across treatments - F(r|T) - where such distributions are obtained from their steady-state relationship with
non-parametrically estimated G(r|T). Weights are equal the share of individuals in each treatment.
Dependent Variable: Sector-Specific Test Score (0-100)
Heterogeneous effects by: Raven Matrices Patience
(1) (2)
Firm Trained X Below Median Trait 2.63 3.50
(8.53) (7.73)
Firm Trained X Above Median Trait 21.1 12.9
(5.51) (7.05)
Vocational Training X Below Median Trait 7.79 7.96
(2.70) (2.40)
Vocational Training X Above Median Trait 13.2 12.2
(2.24) (2.34)
Mean outcome in Control group 30.1 30.1
p-value FT X Low = FT X High .072 .371
p-value VT X Low = VT X High .116 .207
Observations 1,485 1,799
Notes: The data used is from the baseline, second and third follow-up worker surveys in all columns. We
report 2SLS regression estimates, where treatment assignment is used as IV for treatment take-up. Treatment
take-up is defined as a dummy equal to one if the worker (i) started firm training in FT or (ii) started vocational
training in VT. Bootstrap standard errors are calculated using 1,000 replications and reported in parenthesis. All
regressions control for strata dummies, survey wave dummies, a dummy for the implementation round and
dummies for the month of interview. We also control for the following baseline characteristics of workers: age
at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was married at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker had
any children at baseline, a dummy for whether the worker was employed at baseline, and a dummy for whether
the worker scored at the median or above on the cognitive test administered at baseline. At the foot of each
Column we report p-values on the null that the impact of the vocational training is equal to the impact of firm
training, by the various variables considered in each of the columns. Workers are divided into high/low Raven
matrices using their score on the Raven Matrices test implemented at first follow-up. Workers are assigned to
the High Raven group if they scored on or above the median of the Raven Matrices test. Workers are divided
into high/low Patience using their answers to a series of questions about their willingness to wait to receive
(hypothetical) monetary rewards at baseline. Workers are assigned to the High Patience group if they had a
value of Patience on or above the median.
Table A13: Heterogeneous Impacts on Skills
2SLS regression coefficients, bootstrapped standard errors in
parentheses
Table A14: Parameter Estimates of the Job Ladder Search Model
Two-step estimation procedure in Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg [2000]
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
Steady State: November 2015 (Data from Second and Third Follow Up)
Panel A: Parameter Estimates (Monthly) Control Firm Trained
Vocationally
Trained
(1) (2) (3)
Average units of effective labor [USD] 2.31 2.37 2.50
Job destruction rate, δ .027 .026 .024
(.003) (.005) (.004)
Arrival rate of job offers if UNEMPLOYED, λ0 .019 .019 .024
(.002) (.003) (.003)
Arrival rate of job offers if EMPLOYED, λ1 .038 .037 .042
(.010) (.015) (.012)
Panel B: Competition for Workers and Unemployment
Interfirm competition for workers 1.41 1.44 1.77
% Impact: 2.1% 25%
Unemployment rate .589 .575 .502
% Impact: -2.3% -15%
Unemployment duration (months) 52.8 52.4 42.2
% Impact: -.78% -20%
Employment duration (months) 36.8 38.6 41.8
% Impact: 5.0% 14%
Panel C: Wages and Earnings
Average monthly OFFERED wages [USD] 43.1 44.3 46.7
Average monthly ACCEPTED wages [USD] 62.6 64.7 71.7
Impact on annual earnings [USD] 21.4 12.0
% Impact: 6.9% 39%
Notes: The dataset is a cross-section of workers, and for each worker it contains information on: spell type (employment,
unemployment), spell duration (in months), earnings in employment spells (in USD), dates of transitions between spells and
type of transition: (i) job to unemployment, (ii) unemployment to job, or (iii) job to job. Wages are deflated and expressed in
terms of August 2012 prices, using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Deflated
monetary amounts are then converted into August 2012 USD. The dataset contains at most two spells (and one transition) per
individual. The data comes from the second and third follow-up survey of workers, and the initial spell is identified as the
(employment or unemployment) spell that was ongoing in November 2015. Spells are right censored at the date of the third
follow-up interview (which ended in December 2016). Spells are left censored at 1 August 2014. Casual and agricultural
occupations are coded as unemployment. Self-employment is coded as employment (but self-employment spells are assigned
a separate spell). The estimation protocol follows the two-step procedure in Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg [2000]: in the
first step the G function is estimated non-parametrically from the data (so this is just the empirical CDF of observed wages for
those workers that are employed in their first spell), and is then substituted into the likelihood function. In the second step,
maximum likelihood is then conducted using information from both the first and second spells for each individual to recover the
parameter estimates. As shown in Panel A, we estimate separate parameters for Control and Treatment groups, but we pool
together compliers and non-compliers. Outputs in Panel B are derived from the model and computed as functions of the
estimated parameters: (i) interfirm competition for workers=λ1/δ; (ii) unemployment rate=δ/(δ+λ0); (iii) unemployment
duration=1/λ0; employment duration=1/δ. In Panel C average monthly offered and accepted wages are computed as the
product of average offered and accepted piece-rates, and average units of effective labor. We assume workers draw piece-
rates from the same offer distribution F(r). F(r) is the kernel density estimate of a weighted average of the distributions of
offered piece-rates across treatments - F(r|T) - where such distributions are obtained from their steady-state relationship with
non-parametrically estimated G(r|T). Weights are equal the share of individuals in each treatment. For each treatment we then
re-invert F(r) using estimated parameters and steady-state relationships to obtain G(r|T) under the assumption that workers
draw piece-rates from the same offer distribution.
Figure A1a: Wage Distribution of Unskilled Workers at Baseline
Figure A1b: Worker-Firm Wage Subsidy Splits
Notes: The top graph shows the distribution of unskilled workers' wages at baseline. The solid line is drawn in correspondence to
the total amount of wage subsidy under the Firm Training treatment, and the dashed line indicates the median (unskilled) wage at
baseline. A Kernel density estimate of the distribution of wages is also shown. The lower histogram shows the reported monthly
earnings of workers hired through the Firm Training treatment, where the first bar is always the worker’s self-reported wage, and
the second bar is what the firm reports paying the worker.
Median unskilled wage
Firm ReportsWorker Reports
Mean unskilled wage
Figure A2: Firm-provided Training Contract
RecruitmenFirst Follow-up Not Hired tCI
FT Firms - Hire1.2745 3.5098 2.2353 0.2074
Control Firm2.5086 3.8362 1.3276 0.2026
Control Firm 1.5 3.2917 1.7917 0.2429
Control Firm4.1591 4.7273 0.5682 0.2214
FT Firms - N 2.5254 4.0339 1.5085 0.2919
Reported bReported by WorkersReported bReported by Workers
Learnt to pe0.7021 0.6452 0.1357 0.1225
Learnt to pe0.6275 0.4925 0.1373 0.1229
Figure A3: Change in Worker Productivity Between
Recruitment and First Follow-up
Means and 95% Confidence Intervals
Notes: The data used is from the first follow-up survey of firms and workers. In the firm data, the unit of
observation is the employee, and the sample only includes workers hired between 4 and 6 months prior the survey.
In Panel A, the sample Control Firms - trained OTJ includes workers in Control firms who received on-the-job
training; the sample FT Firms - Not hired through Intervention includes all workers hired in firms assigned to the
Firm Training treatment, but not directly through the intervention; the sample FT Firms - Hired through Intervention
includes workers hired through the Firm Training intervention only. For each worker, the respondent (i.e. the firm
owner in most cases) was asked to rate the employee's productivity at recruitment and at the time of the interview
(or at the time when the worker left the firm) on a scale from 1 to 5. The average productivity growth of workers
across the different samples is shown in Panel A. In Panel B, we identified a specific task for each of the study
sectors and asked the respondent (i.e. the firm owner or the worker) whether the worker was able to perform that
task when he joined the firm and at follow-up (or at the time when the worker left the firm). For firm-specific tasks
respondents were asked to identify a task considered particularly important for the firm, and were then asked
whether the worker was able to perform that task when he joined the firm and at follow-up (or at the time when the
worker left the firm). Panel B shows the percentage of workers who learnt how to perform the task between
baseline and follow-up (or between baseline and the time when the worker left the firm) for workers in the firm
training intervention who took-up the treatment. The blue bars report the learning rate as reported by firms; the
orange bars report the learning rate as reported by workers.
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Figure A4: Sector Skills Test for Motor Mechanics
Figure A5: Survival Analysis for Employment
Notes: The Figure plots survival functions for the first employment spell. For Firm Trained workers, we
plot the survival function for workers who started training at the matched firm. For Control and
Vocationally Trained workers, we plot survival functions in the first non-casual and non-agricultural
employment spell in the post-training period (since August 2013).
Figure A6: Comparison of Treatment Impacts to Meta-analysis by McKenzie [2017]
Panel A: Employment impacts Panel B: Earnings impacts
Notes: The Figures compare the treatment impacts from this study to the treatment impacts reported in the meta-analysis by McKenzie [2017]. The green estimates correspond to wage subsidy programs, the blue estimates to vocational training programs,
and the red estimates to job search and matching assistance programs. Panel A reports treatment impacts (ITT) on the probability of paid employment, together with 95% confidence intervals. The estimates from our study are taken from Column 2 of Table 4,
where we use as outcome variable "Any wage employment in the last month". Alongside our estimates, Panel A further reports 22 estimates of treatment impacts taken from Table 1, 3 and 4 of McKenzie [2017]. These correspond to all the available program
estimates for this outcome reported in McKenzie [2017], a part from the estimate from Galasso et al. [2004], which is omitted as no standard error is provided, and the estimate from Groh et al. [2016] with time frame 6 months, as that is estimated while the
wage subsidy was still ongoing (while our estimates for T2: FT and all the other estimates for wage subsidy programs reported in the Figure refer to the period after the wage subsidy ended). Panel B reports treatment impacts (ITT) on earnings, in terms of
percentage increase relative to the earnings level of the Control group, together with 95% confidence intervals. The estimates from our study are taken from Column 4 of Table 5, where we use as outcome variable "Total earnings in the last month". Alongside
our estimates, Panel B further reports 15 estimates of treatment impacts taken from Table 1, 3 and 4 of McKenzie [2017]. These correspond to all the available program estimates for this outcome reported in McKenzie [2017], apart from the estimate from
Groh et al. [2016] with time frame six months, as that is estimated while the wage subsidy was still ongoing (while our estimates for T2: FT and all the other estimates for wage subsidy programs reported in the Figure refer to the period after the wage subsidy
ended), and the estimate from Maitra and Mani [2017], which is excluded as that is very large relative to all the other estimates: Maitra and Mani [2017] estimate a treatment impact on earnings of .957, with confidence interval [.056 ; 1.86]. However, this
corresponds to only a $2.40 monthly increase in earnings in absolute terms, and so the large treatment impact is due to the women in their sample having extremely low earnings to begin with.
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